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INVESTORS BEWARE:  ASSESSING SHAREHOLDER 
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION IN INDIA AND CHINA 
ANN M. SCARLETT* 
ABSTRACT
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the United States 
government bailed out many business entities in exchange for 
equity and debt interests in such entities.  It also dramatically 
increased the regulations imposed on businesses.  This level of 
government ownership and intervention in corporations is rare in 
freemarket capitalist systems such as the United States.  
Government ownership and control, however, are common among 
historically socialist countries such as India or communist 
countries such as China.       
stand in stark contrast to the trend in India and China, which have 
both been moving toward more capitalist systems by disentangling 
government from business enterprises, reducing regulations and 
government interventions, and allowing free markets to develop.  
One specific example of such change in India and China is their 
recent acceptance of the shareholder derivative device, which 
empowers private investors to bring claims on behalf of a 
corporation when it has been harmed by outside parties or, more 
typically, by its own management.  The shareholder derivative 
device is widely recognized among developed countries.  This 
Article compares the nature of corporations and shareholder 
derivative litigation in the United States, India, and China.  It 
specifically examines why India and China have embraced the 
shareholder derivative device and analyzes whether the device 
provides real protection for investors in Indian and Chinese 
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corporations.  Finally, this Article considers the lessons that 




2008 included interventions into private business entities.  To 
ameliorate the disruption to the financial markets, Congress 
enacted sweeping legislation known as the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008,1 which included the wellknown 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).2  As its name suggests, 
TARP authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase 
troubled assets from financial institutions caught in the turmoil of 
the mortgage crisis and stock market collapse.3  As security for the 
purchase of such troubled assets, TARP required that the Treasury 
Department receive stock or debt interests in those institutions.4
TARP further entitled the Treasury Secretary to set corporate 
governance standards for those financial institutions from which it 
purchased troubled assets in exchange for equity or debt interests.5
The Treasury Department, however, never actually bought 
troubled assets from financial institutions as directed by TARP.  
Instead, it simply invested capital into financial institutions in 
return for equity or debt interests.6  For example, the Treasury 
1 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 520152 (2010). 
2 Id. § 5211. 
3 Id.
4 See id. § 5223 (requiring as a precondition to aiding troubled assets that the 
Treasury Department receive warrants to purchase common or preferred stock, 
or           
Department receive senior debt instruments).
5 See id. § 5221      e the financial 
.  Using that 
power, the Treasury Secretary limited the executive compensation of participating 
     See Tarp Capital Purchase 
Program, 31 C.F.R. §§ 30.230.3 (2009).  The Treasury Department also forbade 
golden parachutes for senior executive officers in such institutions.  Id. §§ 30.8
30.9. 
6 See Testimony on the Troubled Assets Relief Program: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 
3 (2009) (outlining a statement by Herbert M. Allison, Jr., Assistant Secretary for 
Financial Stability, U.S. Department of the Treasury) (discussing certain treasury 
programs enacted after the 2008 financial crisis).  See also Press Release, 
Treasury, HP1338: Treasury Releases Guidelines for Targeted Investment 
Program (Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press
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Department invested $45 billion in Citigroup Inc. in return for 
warrants to purchase its common shares, which resulted in the 
       7
The Treasury Department has also twice bailed out American 
International Group Inc. (AIG), an insurance company, which 
      current ownership 
stake.8  Perhaps more shockingly, the Treasury Department 
ordered each of the nine largest financial institutions in the United 
States to accept $125 million, which most of them did not need or 
want, and then refused to allow these institutions to repay those 
funds until it said they were ready to do so.9
In addition, two domestic automakersGeneral Motors Co. 
and Chrysler Group LLCand their affiliated financing entities 
convinced the Secretary of the Treasury to extend $81 billion in 
TARP funds to them and the Treasury Department again acquired 
equity and debt interests in return.10  For example, the Treasury 
Department invested $50 billion in General Motors as part of the 
 bankruptcy reorganization, which resulted in the 
government owning a 61% majority interest in 2009 and currently a 
releases/Pages/hp1338.aspx (discussing the guidelines, justification, and 
eligibility for the Targeted Investment Program). 
7 See Tom Barkley, TARP Profit on Citigroup: $12.3 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052748703293204576 

de           
stock). 
8 See Serena Ng & Erik Holm, AIG Swings to Profit but Problems Persist, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 25, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052748703408604576164724143769978.html  proposed 
           
    Serena Ng et al., AIG, U.S. Agree on an Exit Deal 
Making It Work Will Be Tougher, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704483004575523261932975260.h
tml 
9 See William M. Isaac, Was TARP Worth It?, FORBES, Oct. 1, 2010, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billisaac/2010/10/01/wastarpworthit/ (listing 
the nine financial institutions that were forced to accept the funds: Citigroup, 
JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Bank of New 
York/Mellon, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and State Street).
10 See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: APRIL 20, 2010, at 11416 
(describing TARP aid to the auto industry) see also Josh Mitchell & Sharon Terlep, 
U.S. Unlikely to Recoup GM Bailout, Panel Says, WALL ST. J.
all, the government pumped about $81 billion into rescues of [General Motors and 

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33% stake.11      
      a  
association, credit union, security broker or dealer, or insurance 
compan12
Although these bailouts have been extensively criticized on 
many grounds, the resulting government ownership interests in 
private corporations are perhaps the most troubling aspects for the 
     When faced with a financial 
crisis, officials in the United States government did not trust the 
free market system to correct itself.  Instead, the United States 
government rushed in with public funds to rescue business entities 
allegedly on the brink of disaster.  In return, the government took 
equity and debt interests in these business entities.  Such 
government ownership of private corporations is rare in the 
history of the United States.13  Many commentators argue that the 
esses that 
have the clout to lobby for such handouts and thus threaten the 
competitiveness of other businesses, particularly small ones.14
Similarly, other critics contend that these government 
interventions undermine the functioning of the free market system, 
because businesses are not held responsible for their bad decisions 
by free market forces.15  Criticism has also been leveled at the 
11 See Mitchell & Terlep, U.S. Unlikely to Recoup GM Bailout, supra note 10 

in General Motors). 
12 12 U.S.C. §§ 5202(5), 5211 (2010). 
13 See, e.g., New Panama Canal Company Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57183, 32 
Stat. 481 (1902) (detailing how the United States acquired the Panama Canal) 
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831 et seq. (1933) (establishing 
the Tennessee Valley Authority). 
14 See Keith Naughton & Alison Fitzgerald, Ford Objects to Unfair Advantage 
for Bailed Out GMAC, WASHINGTON EXAMINER, June 8, 2009, 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/business/2009/06/fordobjectsunfair
advantagebailedoutgmac (arguing Ford was placed at a huge competitive 
disadvantage compared to General Motors and its financing arm GMAC because 
the latter received government bailout money Bloomberg data showed Ford 
 for every $1 billion it borrowed Cf. Pete 
Du Pont, Too Much Energy in the Executive, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703373404576148684150871602.h
tml (noting Health and Human Services Department has granted 733 businesses 

15 See Luca Di Leo & Bradley Davis, 
  , WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052748703775704576162541139862146.html (stating that the bailouts 
insulate ins
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      
designed to prevent further harmful conduct by businesses and 
Wall Street, because these regulations have made a negative impact 
on     16  The more the 
government intervenes in private corporations through ownership 
interests or regulatory controls, the more fuel that is added to the 
argument that the United States is edging away from capitalism. 
These recent actions by the United States stand in stark contrast 
to the trend among emerging economies, of which China and India 
are among the largest.17  India and China are moving toward more 
free market systems, such as that in the United States.18  India has 
been liberalizing its prior socialist policies and adopting more 
capitalist policies to foster private corporations and credit 
markets.19  Similarly, China is shifting away from the stateowned 
enterprises that dominated after the Chinese Communist Party 
came to power in the 1940s to privately held businesses.20
One specific example of the changes occurring in India and 
China is their recent acceptance of the shareholder derivative 
   TARP Inspector: Citi Remains 
   , WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052748704307404576080193310619166.html (quoting Special Inspector 
General for TARP as stating that [u]nless and until institutions like Citigroup can 
be left to suffer the full consequences of their own folly, the prospect of more 
bailouts will potentially fuel more bad behsee also Matt Cover, Free Market 
Economists Reject Bailout as Bad Policy that Could Prolong Slowdown, CNS NEWS, 
Sept. 30, 2008, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/freemarketeconomists
rejectbailoutbadpolicycouldprolongslowdown (criticizing the bailouts for 
creating a system 
16 See Jared A. Favole, Business Group Frets Over Rules Review, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
2, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052748703960804576120503694195830.html (noting the Chamber of 
Commerce views the Obama administration as enacting excessive regulations) 
James Inhofe,   Killing Machine, N.Y. POST, Oct. 4, 2010, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/quietest_jobs_killin
g_machine_xAlRo2nRYjtYKaWKAwe7fN (stating U.S. Senator  
opinion that excessive new regulations harm employment). 
17 See World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010, INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external 
/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/weodata/download.aspx (listing China, India, Russia, 
         twelve largest 
economies by gross domestic product using U.S. dollars in 2009, with China first 
and India third among the emerging economies). 
18 See, e.g., SUBHASH CHANDRA JAIN, EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 384 (2006). 
19 See infra Section 3. 
20 See infra Section 4. 
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device.  In 2005, China enacted a statutory provision permitting 
shareholder derivative litigation for the first time.21  India has 
proposed legislation that would also recognize shareholder 
derivative actions.22  Shareholder derivative litigation has long 
been recognized within the United States and most other 
developed countries,23 although the most frequent uses of such 
litigation are in the United States.24  Shareholder derivative 
litigation, however, is much maligned in the United States.  Many 
scholars advocate for the abolition of shareholder derivative 
litigation in the United States,25 while others propose strict 
limitations on such litigation.26  Shareholder derivative litigation 
has even been criticized by courts27 and some state legislatures 
have sought to curtail it through bond and pleading 
requirements.28  In addition, some corporations may even attempt 
21 See infra Section 4.2.2. 
22 See infra Section 3.2. 
23 See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability 
Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 146263 (2006) (assessing the legal risks 
outside directs can expect to face in different countries, including the United 
States). 
24 See Mark J. Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 
TUL. L. REV. 1673, 1674 (2002) (claiming that directors of nonU.S. companies are 
. 
25 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 8.5, 
at 404 (2002) (arguing that derivative litigation should be eliminated, or at least 
discouraged) Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the 
Derivative Suit and the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 36768 (1994) 
(discussing that it may be unnecessary to abolish the derivative suit if aspects of 
procedural law that create incentives for litigation abuse are reformed) Alan J. 
Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1629, 1682 (2002) (noting some principalagent theorists have 
suggested that derivative suits be abolished). 
26 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: 
A Response to the AntiContractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5354 (1990) (arguing that 
corporate rules should be determined by private contract and not by courts). 
27 See 
shareholder derivative actions infringe upon the managerial discretion of 
corporate boards . . . .  Consequently, we have historically been reluctant to permit 
shareholder derivative lawsuits, noting that the power of courts to direct the 
         
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (

by shareholders). 
28 See WRIGHT ET AL., 7C FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIV. 2d § 1835 
(2006) (listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as states requiring shareholder derivative 
           
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to escape shareholder derivative litigation by requiring that 
shareholder disputes be arbitrated.29  Despite the criticism, 
shareholder derivative litig
effective weapons against corporate mismanagement.  Indeed, a 
wave of shareholder derivative actions quickly followed the 
mortgage crisis and financial meltdown in 2008.30
Recent events highlight that the United States may consciously 
or unconsciously be edging away from its free market system, 
while the clear trend in recent years in India and China moves 
toward free market systems.  This Article explores this seemingly 
inverse trend through an examination of the shareholder 
derivative device.       
shareholder derivative litigation demonstrates one way in which 
these emerging economies are seeking to attract domestic and 
foreign investors, and perhaps shows a means by which they seek 
to better compete for capital with developed economies, such as 
the United States.  Empowering shareholders to sue derivatively 
on behalf of corporations reflects China   
efforts     in their corporate 
governance and decrease government involvement in business 
entities.  It may also serve as a useful reference point for businesses 
and governments within the United States as they consider the best 
ways to compete in the everexpanding global economy. 
Section 2 of this Article explains the nature of corporations and 
shareholder derivative litigation in the United States.  Drawing 
comparisons to the United States, Section 3 describes the evolution 
of the corporate structure in India and its recent recognition of the 
shareholder derivative device.  Section 4 then does the same for 
expenses) DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (2008) (requiring shareholder derivative plaintiffs 
to file an affidavit swearing that they will not accept any compensation for 
serving as a representative). 
29 See Andrew J. Sockol, Comment, A Natural Evolution: Compulsory 
Arbitration of Shareholder Derivative Suits in Publicly Traded Corporations, 77 TUL. L.
REV. 1095, 1108 (2003) (proposing arbitration as an alternative to judicial 
resolution of derivative suits) see also Scott R. Haiber, The Economics of Arbitrating 
Shareholder Derivative Actions, 4 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 85, 85 (1991) (noting securities 
law disputes can be resolved through arbitration rather than litigation). 
30 See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 2009 WL 
4030869 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2009) In re     
2009 WL 2610746 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009) In re American International Group, 
Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (providing examples of shareholder 
derivative actions following the financial crisis of 2008 and holding that some 
such claims are predicated on fraud).
04 SCARLETT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011 9:26 PM 
180 U. Pa. J. Intl L. [Vol. 33:1 
China.  In Section 5, the Article analyzes the meaning and likely 
effect of India  
litigation.  It examines the reasons motivating India and China to 
adopt the shareholder derivative device and the basis for the 
specific forms chosen.  In addition, given the existing legal systems 
in China and India, the Article analyzes the likely effectiveness of 
the shareholder derivative device either as a preventative measure 
of ensuring good corporate governance or as a means to remedy 
injuries suffered by corporations.  It will argue that, while India 
and China have adopted a shareholder derivative device that is 
similar to the United States in theory, investors in Indian and 
Chinese companies should be warned that the device will not 
provide similar safeguards in practice.  The Conclusion considers 
the lessons that investors, corporations, and the United States 
should draw from India  s adoption of shareholder 
derivative devices. 
2. CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Unlike corporations in both India and China, which are created 
under the authority of the central government, corporations in the 
United States are creatures of state law and are incorporated under 
the laws of a state, not the federal government.31  Each of the fifty 
states have enacted statutes that govern the powers and operation 
of the corporations incorporated under its laws.32  The states, 
however, are not equals in corporate law.  Delaware, the second 
smallest state in the United States, is the wellrecognized leader in 
corporate law33 and is the leader in the state competition for 
31 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 1.2, at 5. 
32 Id.
33 See   Corporations and the Market for 
Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 67881 (2008) (
corporate law by applying general market rules under which parties choose a 
state of incorporation based on available laws) see also Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy 
and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273, 
1287 n.46 (2009) (significant proportion of corporate regulation is handled at 
the state level, with tiny Delaware being the dominant state in setting corporate 
) see also Omari Scott Simmons, 
Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 117175 (2008) 
(describing Delaware as a leader in corporate law as a result of its experienced 
judiciary, its business friendly reputation, and its substantial market share). 
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corporate charters.34  A majority of states, however, have enacted 
corporation statutes based on the Model Business Corporations Act 
(MBCA),35 which was drafted by a committee of the American Bar 
Association in 1950 and substantially revised in 1984.36
        e 
laws, many of those laws are substantively similar.37  One key 
distinction between Delaware and states adopting some version of 
the MBCA is that Delaware created most of its law on shareholder 
derivative litigation through common law development by its 
courts, while the MBCA is a statutory enactment.  Courts, 
        
requirements much as the Delaware courts must apply their prior 
precedents.  
laws differ       
courts are commonly followed by other states on corporate law 
matters.38      
because of the large number of corporate opinions they produce, 
particularly the Delaware Chancery Court whose judges are 
recognized as having business expertise.  Thus, courts in other 
34 See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 106164 (2000) (arguing that Delaw
success in attracting corporate charters can be explained by the structure and 
operation of its courts) Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious 
Discrimination: FirmBased Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L

35 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., at v, ix. (4th ed. 2008) see also Jones, supra 
note 33, a
law and settling disputes on significant corporate matters, the [MBCA] also has a 
significant influence on the development of corporate law standards throughout 

36 See Mulder, Introduction to ABAALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, at iii (1959). 
The text of the Revised Model Act appears in MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. (4th ed. 
2008). 
37 See Fisch, supra 
minimal
38 See, e.g., Mullen v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir. 
1983) ], we discuss Delaware case 
     
law.  The courts of other states commonly look to Delaware law . . . for aid in 
fashioning rules of c .  See generally William H. Rehnquist, The 
Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the StateFederal Joint Venture of 
Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351 (1992) (celebrating the significance of the 
bution to the U.S. judicial system). 
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
39
2.1. Corporate Legal Structure in the United States 
United States corporations have a single board of directors 
elected by shareholders.40  The directors of United States 
corporations usually include a combination of executive officers 
(inside directors) and independent directors (outside directors).41
Independent directors currently comprise at least half the boards 
for publicly traded corporations,42 although the ability of these 
directors to effectively supervise management is doubted.43
State laws give the board of directors the authority to manage 
the corporation.44  Shareholders elect the directors and thus, at least 
in theory, they may hold those directors accountable for their 
39 Jones, supra note 33, at 1287 n.46.
40 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 212(b) (2009) (describing 
regulations for meetings and votes of shareholders respectively) MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2008) (providing that directors are elected at annual 
. 
41 See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 923 (1999) (defining 
independent directors as outside directors without affiliations to the corporation). 
42 Nicola Faith Sharpe, Rethinking Board Function in the Wake of the 2008 
Financial Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 99, 109 (2010) Bhagat & Black, supra note 41, at 
     public corporations] have a majority of outside 
         DAVID SKEEL,
ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND 
WHERE THEY CAME FROM     s already have a 
       NASDAQ, INC., STOCK 
MARKET RULES § 5605(b)(1) (2009) (requiring that a majority of the board be 
comprised of independent directors) NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 
303A.01 (2009) (same). 
43 See, e.g., SKEEL, supra 
disinterested . . . yet the directors simply nodded their heads as [the CEO and 
CFO] spun their web of ma
supra note 41, at 922 (ndependent directors often turn out to be lapdogs rather 
than watchdogs. Sharpe, supra 
where a majority of directors are outsiders however, these boards often are 
composed of individuals who are not qualified to assess the strategic viability of 

44 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(A) (2009ffairs of 
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation, 
and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the 

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decisions by electing new directors to the board.45  Other than 
electing directors, shareholders possess little power they cannot 
initiate corporate action and vote only on dissolution, sales, 
mergers, and amendments to the articles of incorporation and 
corporate bylaws.46  If shareholders believe directors and officers 
are mismanaging the corporation, failing to exercise proper 
oversight, or acting in their selfinterest, their only recourse, other 
than selling their shares, may be to file a shareholder derivative 
lawsuit. 
2.2. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States 
Courts in the United States have long recognized the 
shareholder derivative lawsuit, having imported the concept from 
England.47  Shareholders may file a shareholder derivative action 
on behalf of the corporation for an injury to the corporation.48
Typical shareholder derivative lawsuits include claims for 
monetary damages based on corporate mismanagement, excessive 
executive compensation, or corporate rights arising out of contract 
or tort law.49  A shareholder may file a direct shareholder lawsuit 
45 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 212(b) (2009) (describing 
regulations for meetings and votes of shareholders respectively) MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2008) (providing that directors are elected at annual 
rd is staggered). 
46 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention 
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 10506 (2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Business 
Judgment Rule] (explaining that shareholders have virtually no power to control 
daily operations of a firm, to control longterm policies, or to initiate corporate 
action) see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 56972 (2003) (discussing the weak 
control rights of shareholders with the view that they are so weak that they 
). 
47 See Nicholas Calcina Howson,     
, 108 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 44, 47 (2009) (noting that the shareholder derivative action 
was imported into U.S. state law from England). 
48 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a)       
shareholders or members of a corporation or an unincorporated association bring 
a derivative action to enforce a right that the corporation or association may 
 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.40(1) (2008) 
           
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 8.2, at 362 
shareholder on behalf of the corporation.  The cause of action belongs to the 
corporation as an entity and arises out of an injury done to the corporation as an 
. 
49 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 8.2, at 363.
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when the shareholder has suffered an injury directly affecting her 
in her individual capacity, such as a claim of oppression by a 
minority shareholder or claims regarding shareholder voting rights 
or preemptive rights.50
Shareholder derivative litigation in the United States faces 
many disincentives and hurdles.  Only shareholders who meet 
certain standing requirements may file derivative actions within 
federal and state courts.  To initiate or maintain a derivative action, 
the plaintiff typically must have been a shareholder at the time of 
the challenged transaction and the plaintiff must also be deemed to 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the corporation and 
its shareholders.51  Several states require plaintiffs filing derivative 
actions to post a bond in an amount sufficient to cover the 

own less than a prescribed amount of stock, measured either by 
shares or dollars.52  A bond requirement is obviously a tremendous 
financial disincentive to filing derivative actions.  Even in the 
absence of any bond requirement, shareholders often have little 
financial incentive to initiate such litigation, because any monetary 
recovery from a successful derivative lawsuit belongs to the 
corporation.53  The shareholder thus at most benefits only to the 
extent that the monetary recovery increases the value of their 
percentage shareholding in the corporation.  No financial incentive 
50 Id. § 8.2, at 36264 (contrasting direct shareholder suits from derivative 
shareholder litigation). 
51 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a)      
maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent 
the interests of shareholders or members who are similarly situated in enforcing 
         MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41(2) (2008) 
(requiring that a shareholder was an owner at the time of action complained and 
   .  But cf. DEL.
CH. CT. R. 23.1(a) & (b) (2009) (requiring that plaintiff was a shareholder during 
the challenged transaction and requiring an affidavit disclaiming any form of 
compensation from serving as the representative of shareholders).
52 WRIGHT ET AL., 7C FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIV. 2d § 1835 (2006) 
(listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as states adopting security or bond for expense 
requirements) see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7107402(3) (2007) (allowing a court to 
compel a shareholder who owns less than a prescribed amount of stock to post a 
bond) N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 627 (same). 
53 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, at § 8.2, at 36263 (providing the example of 
derivative shareholder litigation arising from a breach of contract in which the 
corporation as a whole was hurt and therefore a remedy should benefit all 
shareholders). 
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may exist for shareholders contemplating a derivative action 
seeking only injunctive relief. 
In addition, shareholders who lose their derivative actions 

socalled American Rule that parties to litigation pay their own 
.54  Yet, unlike in many European countries, a losing 
shareholder         
 55  Even if the derivative lawsuit is ultimately 
successful, the shareholderplaintiff must finance the litigation 
until settlement or verdict occurs.  This financial burden during 
litigation, however, can be alleviated if the shareholder can find an 
attorney willing to take the derivative lawsuit on a contingency 
basis, which is permitted in the United States.56  When a derivative 
lawsuit settles, which most do,57    
receive a sizeable fee from the fund created by the settlement upon 
court approval.58  When the rare derivative lawsuit reaches a final 
54 See, e.g., 1, 247 
(1975)          
redistributing litigation costs in a manner c John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities 
Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 67 (1999) [hereinafter Coffee, Privatization] 
 American Rule, each side bears its own legal fees (which 
            
invested in the action if the action is unsuccessful and is not generally liable for 
)
55 See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability 
Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1406 (2006) (discussing the United 
Kingdom    as one of many deterrents to derivative litigation) 
Franklin Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 453, 488 (2007) 
 which places a significant financial risk on 
a complaining shareholder who also recovers nothing personally if the suit is 
successful). 
56 See Coffee, Privatization, supra note 54, at 6 
may charge contingent fees in the United States, but that such fees are not 
authorized in the United Kingdom). 
57 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in 
Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 910 (1985) [hereinafter Coffee, 
Unfaithful] (noting that a majority of shareholder derivative lawsuits are resolved 
through settlement) Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without 
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 60 (1991) (finding settlement in about 65% of 
resolved shareholder derivative lawsuits in a sample study from the late 1960s 
through 1987). 
58 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.       
Amy M. 
Koopmann, A Necessary Gatekeeper: The Fiduciary Duties of the Lead Plaintiff in 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 34 J. CORP. L     
           
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         
attorney their fees from the monetary recovery.59
A significant procedural hurdle for shareholder derivative 
litigation in the United States is the demand requirement.  
       
litigation, because the board possesses the statutory authority to 
manage the corporation and its assets, which would include a 
cause of action.60  In federal court and most state courts, a 
shareholder is allowed to file a derivative action only after making 
demand on the board to rectify the challenged transaction.61  In 
may stand to receive a large fee from a settlement, even a settlement that brings 
       Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation and Corporate Governance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 23 (1999) 
[hereinafter Loewenstein, Shareholder].  
In recent years, however, the courts have  . . . been willing to award 
attorneys' fees to the plaintiff if the derivative litigation resulted in a 
substantial or common benefit to the corporation, whether by judgment 
or settlement.  The courts have been quite willing, too willing perhaps, to 
find a substantial benefit when the derivative action settles, the plaintiff 
seeks attorneys' fees, and the defendant does not object. 
Id. 
59 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric AutoLite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) 
(recognizing that successful    

without contributing equally to the litigation expenses would be to enrich the 
see also Loewenstein, Shareholder, supra 
note 58, at 2 
the derivative litigation resulted in a substantial or common benefit to the 

60 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
8.01(b) (2009). 
61 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3).  
The complaint must be verified and must . . . state with particularity . . . 
(A) any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the 
directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the 
shareholders or members and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the 
action or not making the effort. 
Id.  See also DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 The complaint shall also allege with 
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the 
plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for 
the plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2008).  
No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) a 
written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable 
action and (2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was made 
unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that the demand has 
been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the 
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response to the     
(1) choose to prosecute the litigation itself (2) resolve the matter 
through internal means or (3) reject the demand.62  If the board 
rejects the demand, which is the typical board response, the 
shareholder must demonstrate to the court that the demand was 
wrongfully rejected before being allowed to proceed with a 
derivative action.63  In some states, the shareholder can forego 
making demand and argue that demand is excused, which requires 
a showing that demand would be futile.64
To establish that demand is futile or that demand was 
wrongfully rejected by the board, the plaintiff must show that the 
         
decision.65  As more fully explained below, this defense presumes 
that directors acted consistent with their fiduciary duties of care, 
corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90day 
period. 
Id. 
62 See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in 
Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 13491350 n.55 
(1993) 
pursue corrective actions or take charge of the litigation.  If management 
disagrees with the shareholder's contentions, the demand requirement gives the 
corporation the chance to reject the 
63 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 8.5, at 395 see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the 
, 
42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408 (2005) 
). 
64 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (stating that demand is 
futile and thus excused when officers and directors are under influences that 
impede their discretion to act on behalf of the corporation).  The MBCA, however, 
states a universal demand requirement.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2008). 
65 See Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000).  
s emphasis on the business judgment rule supports 
excusing demand in the case of an evenly divided board . . . .  And in a 
situation where a plaintiff shows that the business judgment rule is 
inapplicable to a board decision, Aronson    futility of 
demand has been established by any obj
Id. (internal citations omitted).  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 
25, at 395.  Although plaintiffs argue that they cannot allege such facts with 
particularity before discovery, courts typically state that plaintiffs already possess 
the tools for gathering sufficient evidence.  See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 
1207, 1216 n.11 (Del. 1996) (describing shareh
as the media and governmental agencies, and the right to inspect corporate 
records) see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2009) (stating 
inspection right) MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02 (2008). 
04 SCARLETT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011 9:26 PM 
188 U. Pa. J. Intl L. [Vol. 33:1 
loyalty, and good faith.66  To show the defense does not apply in 
the demand context, the shareholder typically must show that a 
majority of directors were financially interested in the challenged 
decision or were not independent in making that decision.67  In 
other words, a trial court will permit a shareholder derivative 
lawsuit to proceed only when the board of directors is disabled by 
some conflict of interest because in such circumstances the judge 
may presume the directors will not sue themselves.
Even when a shareholder survives a motion to dismiss based 
on the demand requirement, a special litigation committee (SLC) 
composed of independent and disinterested directors may move to 

continuing the litigation is not in the best interests of the 
corporation.68  Most courts find that the business judgment rule 
    69 and therefore grant the 
motion to dismiss.70
66 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)  
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in 
 see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916
17 (Del. 2000) (same noting that the initial burden is on the shareholder to rebut 
the presumption of the business judgment rule). 
67 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 81415 (Del. 1984) (stating that the 
court reviews the factual allegations to determine whether the issue involves an 
     case the business judgment rule is 
inapplicable to the board majority approving the transaction) see also Beneville v. 
York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that in the case of a board with 
only two directors, business judgment rule protection is unavailable because the 
interested director can block the action of the impartial director).  For the MBCA 
provisions for overcoming demand, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44(c) (2008). 
68 Douglas M. Branson,  the Business Judgment Rule, 
36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 64748 (2002) (explaining the procedure for establishing a 
          
         
power to deal with the pending action, hiring an independent law firm to conduct 
an investigation, and preparing a report that may be filed with a motion for 
summary judgment) see also Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of 
Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 279 (1986) (noting a SLC may believe dismissal is 
y raise the stock price). 
69 In some states, the plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting the business 
          
inquiry is limited to the disinterestedness and independence of the committee 
members and the adequacy of their investigation.  See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) Finley v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128, 
132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) Cutshall v. Barker, 733 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000) Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Minn. 2003).  Other states 
04 SCARLETT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011 9:26 PM 
2011] INDIA AND CHINA DERIVATIVE ACTIONS 189 
Assuming plaintiffs survive these initial motions to dismiss, the 
directors can again assert the business judgment rule defense in a 
motion for summary judgment or at trial.71  The business judgment 
rule defense is a common law principle that has been recognized 
by courts in the United States for almost 200 years.72  An often
stated rationale for the business judgment rule defense is to 
provide the protection needed for directors to fulfill their 
responsibility to manage the corporation without fear of 
shareholders secondguessing their decisions through derivative 
lawsuits.73  Thus, the rule allows directors to take calculated 
business risks74       

the burden of proof on the defendants.  See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty 
Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 37879 (6th Cir. 1984) Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 225 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).  In Delaware, the defendant also bears the burden of 
proving the independence and good faith of the SLC, but the court may apply its 
own business judgment in deciding whether to dismiss.  Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 78789 (Del. 1981). 
70 Fairfax, supra note 63        rity of cases 
       
Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI 
Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 135657 (1993)). 
71 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 747 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (stating that the business judgment rule applies in the absence of fraud, bad 
faith, selfdealing, or acting in a way that cannot be attributed to a rational 
business purpose by the directors). 
72 See S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
93, 93 (1979) (discussing the idea that the business judgment rule is often 
misunderstood, despite its long use in corporate law). 
73 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) 
(describing the balance between deference to bo    
         A.L.I., 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 
cmt. d (1994) Arsht, supra note 72, at 95 (stating the business judgment rule 

every corporate transaction to be subject to judicial review at the request of a 

74 See Bainbridge, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 46, at 110 (referencing 
          
Principles of Corporate Governance that the rule protects directors from hindsight 
reviews of decisions that would stifle innovation) Branson, supra note 68, at 637 
(stating the business judgment rule is necessary to encourage directors to engage 
Boss of 
rtant Judge Takes on Greedy Executives, Congress, and 
the History of Corporate Law, LEGAL AFFAIRS 43, 46 (July/Aug. 2005) (stating that  
guess decisions made by informed, disinterested 
boards, for fear of chilling commerce an
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mistakes of judgment or unpopular business decisi75  Other 
justifications include that suited than courts to 
make business decisions.76
The Delaware Supreme Court articulates the business 
judgment rule defense as a presumption that directors have acted 
consistently with their fiduciary duties in making decisions for the 
corporation.77  To rebut that presumption, plaintiffs must show a 
breach of fiduciary duty78 or demonstrate fraud, illegality, or 
waste.79  If the plaintiff cannot rebut the presumption, the business 
75 Arsht, supra note 72, at 96 see also Bainbridge, Business Judgment Rule, supra 
note 46, at 113
among a number of plausible alternatives.  Given the vagaries of business, 
moreover, even carefully made choices among such alternatives may turn out 

76 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) see also Branson, 
supra        equipped to review business 
 
as to business matters such as competitive outlook, cost structure, and economic 
   Fairfax, supra note 62, at 410 (stating that directors are 
   ).  This judicial deference 
for business decisions is difficult to justify, since courts willingly review decisions 
of physicians and engineers.  See Bainbridge, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 46, 

       FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991) (asking 
why judges can decide whether engineers have properly designed jet engines but 
           

77 See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 
2006) (describing due care determinations).  To invoke the business judgment rule 
defense, the board must make a decision, which includes a decision to act or a 
conscious decision not to act.  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984). 
78 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984) (citing Penn Mart 
Realt
to inform themselves) see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 91617 (Del. 
2000).  
Procedurally, the initial burden is on the shareholder plaintiff to rebut 
the presumption of the business judgment rule.  To meet that burden, the 
shareholder plaintiff must effectively provide evidence that the 
defendant board of directors, in reaching its challenged decision, 
breached any one  triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good faith or 
due care.
Id. 
79 See, e.g., 
(dealing with illegality and fraud) In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 
906 A.2d 27, 7374 (Del. 2006) (dealing with allegations of waste) Lewis v. 

           
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judgment rule defense protects the directors from liability for their 
decision.80  On the other hand, if the plaintiff can rebut the business 
judgment rule defense, the directors must then prove that the 
challenged transaction was fair to the corporation.81  The MBCA 
also contains much of the business judgment rule defense within 
its standards of liability for directors.82  Judges invoke the business 
judgment rule defense to protect boards of directors from legal 
liability in the vast majority of shareholder derivative actions.83
Establishing a breach of fiduciary duty thus becomes an 
important element in most shareholder derivative actions.  The 
fiduciary duties of directors are typically stated as a triad: care, 
loyalty, and good faith.  Delaware courts state that the duty of care 
          
     84 and that 
directors are liable only if grossly negligent.85  The combined effect 
    ) Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1968) (considering the issue of fraud). 
80 McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 91617 (Del. 2000) (describing the 
business judgment rule attaching to protect directordefendants if the plaintiff
shareholder fails to rebut the presumption provided by the rule) Citron v. 
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (same). 
81 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 9091 (Del. 2001)  
presumption of the business judgment rule is rebutted, however, the burden shifts 
to the director defendants to prove to the trier of fact that the challenged 
 see also In re The Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (same). 
82 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 cmt. (2008    oes not 


83 See Fairfax, supra note 63s grant 
to board decisions means that courts hold directors liable for only the most 
see also TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND 
HONESTY: AMERICAS BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 183
historical stUnfaithful, supra note 57, 
at 9 (noting that the rare shareholder derivative lawsuits in which judges reach 
         by a ratio of 
twenty to one). 
84 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) see also 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 36970 (Del. 1993) (holding 
directors violated their duty of care because they were 
of all material information reasonably available before approving merger 
agreement). 
85 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (ex         
 Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 1990 WL 42607, 

to or a delibera 
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of the focus on procedural due care and the gross negligence 
standard is that Delaware courts rarely hold directors liable for 
breaching their duty of care.86  Similarly, the MBCA states that 

a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar 
87       
not reasonably believe [the decision] to be in the best interests of 

director reasonably believed appropriate   88

care can be effectively eliminated, because all the states have now 
enacted statutes allowing corporations to limit or eliminate 
 of care breaches89 as well as to purchase 
insurance to indemnify against such liability.90
According to Delaware courts, the duty of loyalty requires that 
directors make decisions independently based on the merits of the 

261 (Del. Ch. 1929)). 
86 See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch. 
see also Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate 
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1790      
from liability whenever they make even a modest attempt to follow the 
supra note 63, at 407
years, a variety of mechanisms have contributed to a virtual elimination of legal 
           
Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353, 369 
Van Gorkom is famous, of course, because it marked one of the few times 
         cf. Stuart R. 
Cohn,            
Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 n.12 (1983) 
(noting only seven cases holding directors liable for all breaches of fiduciary duty 
other than selfinterested transactions).
87 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2008). 
88 Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii). 
89 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009) (permitting the certificate 
of incorporation to eliminate or limit a directopersonal liability for monetary 
damages for fiduciary duty breaches except for a breach of the duty of loyalty, 
acts or omissions not in good faith acts involving intentional misconduct or a 
knowing violation of law  for any transaction from which the director 
derived an improper personal benefit Fairfax, supra note 63, at 412 (describing 

. 
90 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009). 
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transaction and that they be disinterested in its outcome.91
         
they will receive a personal financial benefit from [it] that is not 
equally shared by the stockholders.92  Independence requires that 
directors base their decisions      
subject    93  Delaware courts, 
however, rarely find a director to be controlled by another94 and 
never find nonfamilial relationships to be bias producing.95
Similarly, the MBCA states the duty      
        
    
domination or control by, another person having a material 
96
91 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993) We have 
generally defined a director as being independent only when the director's 
decision is based entirely on the corporate merits of the transaction and is not 
      see also Orman v. 
Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating the business judgment rule is 

of the transaction or lacked the independence to consider objectively whether the 
transaction was in the best interest of its company and all of its sharehol
92 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (Directorial interest also 
exists where a corporate decision will have a materially detrimental impact on a 
director, but not on the corp
93 Id. see also Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 26465 (Del. 2002) 
(defining independence by focusing on whether the director has a familial 
relationship with someone in the transaction or is controlled by another director 
who is interested in the transaction). 
94 Branson, supra 
reputable see also Beam v. Stewart, 
845 A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004).  

plaintiff must plead facts that would support the inference that because 
of the nature of a relationship or additional circumstances other than the 
interested 
director would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the 
relationship with the interested director. 
Id. 
95            
personal friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing alone, are 
insufficient to raise a rea     
Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 98081 (Del. Ch. 2000) 
(finding allegation that a director was controlled by another director based on 
their 15year professional and personal relationship was insufficient to raise a 
reasonable doubt as to independence). 
96 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(iii) (2008). 
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T
independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the 
    97  The Delaware Supreme Court has 
defined the duty of good faith by identifying two categories of 
 
         98
 
 99  The Court, however, has held that a 
           

100  By contrast, the MBCA imposes 
101
3. CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION IN INDIA 
India has been greatly influenced by England.  India was an 
English colony from 1668 when the British East India Company 
gained control of Bombay (now Mumbai)102 until 1947 when India 
gained its independence from England.103  Thus, it is not surprising 

as the U.S. legal system can be traced to England.104  In fact, some 
105  While 
97  Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
98 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006). 
99 Id. at 66 (describing this second category as proscribing fiduciary conduct 
that does not involve disloyalty but yet is more culpable than gross negligence). 
100 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d at 36970 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 
492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
101 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(i) (2008) 
to the corporation or its shareholders . . . unless the party asserting liability in a 
proceeding establishes that . . . the challenged conduct consisted or was the result 

102 BARBARA A. FENELL, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH: A SOCIOLINGUISTIC APPROACH 
241 (2001). 
103 Afra Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from the Indian 
Experience, 29 NW. J. INTL L. & BUS. 335, 348 (2009) (  
economic growth after difficult economic periods following independence in 
1947). 
104 Rajesh Chakrabarti, Corporate Governance in India  Evolution and Challenges
9 (Indian Sch. of Bus., Working Paper, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=649857      
common law system). 
105 See John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India, 
43 LAW & SOCY REV. 491, 499 (2009) (citing Indian Penal Code (1860) Indian 
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an English colony, India had a capital market structure and 

  106  India had four stock exchanges with 
over 800 companies trading on them, including the Mumbai Stock 
Exchange established in 1875.107  Not only did India have a large 
capital market for an English colony, but it also had a  well
developed . . . banking system.108
After gaining independence from England, India turned 
towards socialist ideas, and corporate governance radically 
changed.109  Socialist planners had a set of core policies when they 
    sufficiency by restricting 
capital flow and imports, channel capital into large
  te against largescale private sector 
firms in favor of smallscale firms, and foster development by 
investing in education.110      
economy languished under what was referred to disparagingly as 
 averaging 3% per annum until the early 
111  This compares to a rate of 6% since liberalization began 
in the mid1980s.112
Since the mid1980s, India has liberalized its economic policies 
      
for global investment.113       
        

Contract Act (1872) Indian Evidence Act (1872) Criminal Procedure Code (1873) 
Negotiable Instruments Act (1881) Indian Trusts Act (1882) General Clauses Act 

. 
106 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 351. 
107 Id.
108 Id. at 352. 
109 See Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 14
socialism during the decades following independence) see also Armour & Lele, 
supra note 105, at 499500       
postindependence government). 
110 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 496.
111 Id. see also Afsharipour, supra 

to the slow growth rate often called the Hindu rate of growth.). 
112 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 496. 
113 Shardul S. Shroff et al., An Overview of the Legal Regime Governing Capital 
Markets in India and Current Developments, 1720 PLI/CORP 51, 55 (2009). 
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       114
Especially strong economic areas for India include pharmaceutical 
and medical services, such as reading xrays for patients, as well as 
computer services.115  India has experienced dramatic changes in 
its economic structure during the past decade, and its stock 
markets hit record highs in January 2008.116  In 20072008, 124 
companies made public offerings in the markets totaling almost 
$18 million in U.S. dollars.117
Additionally, foreign investment in India has grown 
exponentially.  the most attractive 
        
growth     118  Net foreign direct 
investment into India amounted to $22.9 billion in U.S. dollars in 
2007.119        row, but 
foreign investors have reported success in doing business with 
India.           
with India report as much success, or even better success than 
120
114 ARVIND PANAGARIYA, INDIA: THE EMERGING GIANT 107 (2008). 
115 See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 3    
          
the pharmaceutical and computer services industries). 
116 See id. at 35556 (discussing reforms in corporate governance in India) see 
also Franklin Allen et al., Financing Firms in India, USC FBE Finance Seminar, at 10, 
Apr. 13, 2007, available at http://www.usc.edu/schools/business 
/FBE/seminars/papers/F_41307_ALLEN   

of market capitalization at the end of 2005 and its National Stock Exchange was 
eighteenth). 
117 Shroff et al., supra note 113, at 56. 
Furthermore, 36 companies raised reserves worth [$5.231 million in U.S. 
dollars] through the qualified institutional placement . . . [of] external 
commercial borro      
March 2008 amounted to 
[$221.2 billion in U.S. dollars], reflecting an increase of 30.4% over the 
previous year. 
Id. 
118 Id. at 8990. 
119 Id.
120 Navneet S. Chugh, Doing Business in India 2009: Critical Legal Issues for U.S.
Companies, 1720 PLI/CORP 377, 381 (2009). 
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3.1. Corporate Legal Structure in India 
Prior       
derived from the 1850 Joint Stock Companies Act, which was 
       121  After 
independence, India continued to base its laws on the English 
system.  Even during I
its corporate laws, India followed suit by establishing a committee 
to review its corporate laws.122  So, like English companies and 
corporations in the United States, Indian corporations have a single 
board appointed by the shareholders.123
3.1.1.  
       
controlled corporate governance through various statutes.  The 
1947 Capital Issues Control Act forced private companies to get 
government permission to issue new equity, and then the 
government controlled the price of such equities.124  A later statute 
prevented private companies in India from merging or acquiring 
other companies to realize economies of scale.125  The government 
also took control of securities trading and listing requirements for 
the stock exchanges through the 1956 Securities Contract 
Regulation Act.126  The 1956 Companies Act gave the central 
government (exercised through the Department of Companies 
 
the judicial system power to regulate and oversee companies,127
121 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 353. 
122 See id.       
ultimately formed the basis for the Companies Act, 1956, was convened partly in 
response to the report of the United Kingdoms Cohen Committee, which 
recommended far       
(internal citations omitted)). 
123 Klaus J. Hopt and Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe  Recent 
Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, France, and Italy, 1 ECFR 135, 150 (2004) (discussing the United 
tier board model). 
124 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 500, tbl.3 (discussing the 1947 Capital 
Issues Control Act). 
125 Id. (discussing the 1969 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act). 
126 Id. (discussing the 1956 Securities Contract (Regulation) Act). 
127 Id. (discussing the 1956 Companies Act). 
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     128  The 1985 Sick 
Industrial Companies Act created a state agency to take control of 
firms with negative net assets.129 
regime and culture of licensing, protection and widespread red
tape that bred corruption and stilted the growth of the corporate 
130
During this period, India lacked strong and developed stock 
markets.  Three development finance institutions (DFIs), state 
financial corporations, became the main providers of longterm 
credit to companies.  Through such lending, these entities acquired 
large blocks of shares in the borrowing companies and their large 
      
directors.131  Bank executives serving as board members, however, 

management.132  At the same time, compan
businesses with little equity investment of their own so promoters 

the DFI nominee directors mute spectators i  133
 slow bankruptcy process134
135 banks often refused to lend except to 
128 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 14 (noting that the 1956 Companies Act and 
other laws governed the functioning of joint stock companies and protected 

129 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 500, tbl.3 (discussing the 1985 Sick 
Industrial Companies Act). 
130 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 15. 
131 See id. (commenting that the board of directors were nominated by 
organizations with the highest quantity rather than highest quality of lending).  
132 See id. (discussing the nominated directors routine of rubberstamp[ing
for the management).  
133 Id. at 16. 
134 See id. 
year timeline to reach a decision) see also Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 50001 
    year windingup).  When the board eroded the 
          
reorganization system created by the 1985 Sick Industrial Companies Act.  
Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 16.  The company would be referred to the Board 
for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR).  Id.  Once registered with BIFR, 
Id.  There 
are some problems with the system, including: massive delays in the BIFR 
reaching a decision, very few companies emerging successfully from BIFR, and a 
legal process taking over ten years on average for companies that needed to be 
liquidated.  Id. 
135 See Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 500 (highlighting that creditors had 
few options other than filing a suit to recover unpaid debts). 
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blue chip companies and instead invested in government 
securities.136  Because financial institutions limited their activities 
and boards were largely ineffective in monitoring management 
during the socialist era, minority shareholders were often subject to 
fraud.137
3.1.2.  
After socialism failed, India began liberalizing its economy in 
the mid1980s.138 ralizing its economy 

it threw off the shackles of Fabian socialism and embraced free 
139  Following a currency crisis in 1991,140 he 
government implemented a dramatic reconfiguration  
economy.  The motivating idea was to move decisively away from 
state control by granting a significant role to the private sector, 
encouraging competition, developing marketoriented 
    141  Some 
goals of corporate governance included increasing investor 
protection and foreign investment by repealing socialist era laws 
and by creating new laws to attract investors.142  Foreign investors 
          
socialist era.143
136 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 16. 
137 Id. at 17 (discussing instances of both unintentional and deliberate 
irregular share transfers and registrations that have negatively impacted minority 
shareholders).   
138 See Afsharipour, supra 
made some tentative moves towards economic liberalization, although most of the 

139 Amit Varma, , WALL ST. J. ASIA, June 16, 2005, 
at A9.  
140 See generally Valerie Cerra & Sweta Chama Saxena, What Caused the 1991 
Currency Crisis in India?, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 395 (2002), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2002/03/pdf/cerra.pdf 
(chronicling the devaluation of the rupee in the early 1990s and a subsequent 
depletion of international reserves).  
141 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 501. 
142 Id. at 501 (stating that the Capital Issues Control Act and the Sick 
Industrial Companies Act were repealed, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 
was replaced with the Foreign Exchange Management Act, and the Securities 
Contract Regulation Act and Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act were 
amended to reduce government control of securities activities). 
143 See id.       
opened to investment by foreign institutional investors, overseas corporate 
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One of the most important developments was the 
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
in 1992, because it replaced central government control of the stock 
exchanges.144  The SEBI is similar to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission it is an independent regulatory 
administration and can issue binding regulations on the stock 
exchanges.145  The government also built up its securities markets 
by establishing the National Stock Exchange in 1992, the National 
Securities Clearing Corporation Limited in 1995, and the National 
Securities Depository Limited in 1996.146  These new and 
independent institutions provided the necessary infrastructure for 
 growing stock markets and provided a sense of 
security for foreign investors, who were newly permitted to invest 
      147  Unfortunately, 
      
because the SEBI and the Ministry of Company Affairs share 
jurisdiction to regulate companies.148
While India has done much to revamp equity finance, it lacks 
major reform in corporate debt leaving creditors without an 
adequate remedy.149  To protect creditors, India established the 
quasilegal Debt Recovery Tribunal and passed the 2002 
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security 
Interest Act and the 2004 Enforcement of Security Interest and 
bodies, and nonresident Indians, who have been allowed to invest extensively in 

144 See Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 18 (calling the establishment of the 

in th
145 Armour & Lele, supra 
a regulatory framework to ensure transparency of trading practices, speedy 
settlement procedures, enforcement of prudential norms, and full disclosure for 
investor protection, rather than the prior emphasis on government intervention 

146 See id. at 503 (discussing the establishment of the National Stock Exchange, 
the National Securities Clearing Corporation, and the National Securities 
Depository Limited). 
147 See id. (highlighting the increase in the number of market participants 
since the opening of Indian stock markets to foreign investors) see also id. at 492 
(stating that the regulatory agencies, instead of the legislative or judicial branches, 
were the most effective method of producing improved legal rules). 
148 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 356. 
149 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 505 (discussing the limited application 
of debt enforcement laws to banks and financial institutions ordinary creditors 
could still only recovery through civil courts).  
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Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act.150  The effectiveness of 
the new tribunal and these new laws, however, remains to be seen.  
According to a 2007 World Bank report, the completion of a 
corporate bankruptcy in India still averages ten yearsa tie with 
Chad for the longest bankruptcy completion time in the world.151
3.1.3. Article 49  
In the early 1990s, India experienced a series of financial 
scandals, such as the Harshad Mehta stock market scam of 1992.152
These scandals occurred after brokers purchased stock at 
extraordinarily low prices, subsequently inflated prices, and then 
sold the stock at the higher prices causing the stock market to 
crash.153  A similar scandal in 2001 again caused the stock market to 
crash.154  The brokers were able to arrange these deals with 
       
equities and the stock exchanges was relaxed in the postsocialist 
era, the laws were too lax to avoid such deals.155  In addition, a 
        
than 4,000 companies raised 54,000 crore rupees (more than $1.2 
billion in toda156
150 Allen et al., supra note 116, at 8 (discussing the measures taken to protect 

151 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 505 n.16 see also Country Profile of India, 
WORLD BANK http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES 
/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:295589~pagePK:141159~piPK:1411
10~theSitePK:295584,00.html (last updated Jan. 14, 2011) (providing information 

152 The scam allegedly defrauded an estimated 20 million people of $1.5 
billion.  Molly Moore, Panel Blasts Banks, Regulators in India Stock Scam, WASH.
POST, Dec. 22, 1993, at D3.  Harshad Mehta reportedly gave the Indian Prime 
Minister a suitcase full of cash so that he would overlook all the cash that banks 
used to flood the Indian stock exchange.  Id.  Mehta, a government official, also 
supposedly hindered the investigation. BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
Parliamentary Report on Securities Scandal Presented, Dec. 22, 1993, at pt. 3 Asia. 
153 See Tania Mazumdar, Where the Traditional and Modern Collide: Indian 
Corporate Governance Law, 16 TUL. J. INTL & COMP. L. 243, 252 (2008) (describing 
          
governance reform).  
154 See id. (noting that the Bombay Stock Exchange crashed by 147 points in 
2001 due to stock broker scandals).  
155 See id. 
the fraudulent companies, merchants, and brokers).  
156 Mazumdar, supra note 153, at 252 (discussing how these companies failed 
Rupee is the basic Indian monetary 
unit.  See generally THE CURRENCY CONVERTER, 
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Following these scandals, the Indian industry led the initial 
efforts to instill public confidence in corporations and the securities 
markets through changes in corporate governance.157  In 1998, the 
Confederation of Indian Industry set up a voluntary code, called 
the Desirable Corporate Governance Code, to protect small 
investors, promote transparency, and take steps toward 
international standards of disclosure.158  In the two years following 
the creation of the Desirable Corporate Governance Code, twenty
five companies voluntarily adopted the code.159
While there were many proposals for changing corporate 
governance, the SEBI developed a new provision that was based 
      sirable Corporate 
Governance Code.160  The SEBI adopted Article 49 of the Listing 
Agreement and the provisions went into effect between March 
2001 and March 2003.161  Although Article 49 only applies to 
companies that have more than 3 crore rupees (about $660,000 in 
U.S. dollars) in capital at the time it issued its shares,162 researchers 
described         
163  Similar to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 enacted 
http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) (providing the 
conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 crore equals 10 million 
rupees).
157 Id. at 251 see also Sarita Mohanty, SarbanesOxley: Can One Model Fit All?, 
12 NEW. ENG. J. INTL & COMP. L. 1, 4 (2006) (noting that Indian corporate 
governance calls for transparency and accountability in decisionmaking).  
158 CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUS., DESIRABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A
CODE (1998), http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents 
/desirable_corporate_governance240902.pdf. 
159 Mazumdar, supra note 153, at 252. 
160 See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 36575 (discussing the proposed 
government reforms and their associated implementation and enforcement 
issues). 
161 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 19 (stating the three dates in which the 
Listing Agreements were applied to various types of companies).  
162 See Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate 
Governance, Enforcement, and Firm Value: Evidence from India 2, 6 (U. Mich. L. & 
Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 08005, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105732 (emphasizing that Clause 49 was not intended 
to apply to all listed firms in India).  See generally THE CURRENCY CONVERTER, 
http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited February 25, 2011) (providing 
the conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 crore equals 10 
million rupees). 
163 Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can Corporate Governance 
Reforms Increase Firms Market Values? Event Study Evidence from India, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 749, 757 (2007). 
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by the United States after a series of corporate scandals,164 Article 

         
India, imposes severe monetary penalties and threats of delistment 
for public companies that do not follow its mandates.165  Although 
Article 49 was perhaps inspired by reform efforts in the United 
States and England, there is substantial debate on the convergence 
of the AngloAmerican model of corporate governance in India.166
l, economic, and social frameworks 
have created a corporate governance environment that only 
formally mirrors Anglo167
3.2. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in India 
During the socialist era, shareholders could potentially bring a 
lawsuit for oppression or mismanagement under the 1956 
Companies Act.168  The 1956 Companies Act, however, was unclear 
regarding whether shareholders could file derivative actions on 
behalf of the corporation and other shareholders.  
Parliament is currently in the process of enacting a new Companies 
Bill that would more clearly allow shareholder derivative actions 
and also permit shareholder class actions.169  The new Companies 
164 The SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 sought to improve the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures. SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107
204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 
U.S.C.). 
165 Mazumdar, supra note 153, at 253. 
166 See generally Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 34347 (discussing various 
 on the convergence debate in India). 
167 Id. at 341. 
168 See id. at 355 (observing that the Companies Act focused on cases of 
oppression and mismanagement, not investor protection).  See generally The 
Companies Act, 1956, INDIA CODE, § 397 (1956), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=195601 (noting that oppression refers 
to conducting the affairs of a company in a manner prejudicial to public interest or 
interests of the company and its shareholders) id. § 398 (stating that 
        
prejudicial to the interests of the company or the public interest).  
169 See SooJeong Ahn et al., Asia / Pacific, 43 INTL LAW. 1007, 101314 (2009) 
(listing the intended goals and provisions of the 2008 Companies Bill).  See 
generally Indian Companies Bill 2009 Likely to be Enacted by Year End, ASIA PULSE,

seek to give shareholders, particularly the minority shareholders a voice and 
balance the interests between the minority and majority shareMohan R. 
Lavi, ClassAction Suits in the Bill, BUS. LINE (HINDU), Nov. 26, 2009, at 9 
not much prevalent in India save for a meek shout at an 
04 SCARLETT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011 9:26 PM 
204 U. Pa. J. Intl L. [Vol. 33:1 
Bill updates the 1956 Companies Act.170  It was originally 
introduced in Parliament during 2008, and the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Finance successfully completed its 
examination in August 2010.171  In 2011, the Ministry of Corporate 

session.172
At 260 pages, the new Companies Bill covers many different 
aspects of corporate governance, shareholder protection, and 
government oversight of companies.173  While not yet in force, the 
new Companies Bill will provide for significant changes in Indian 
corporate governance.174 
the corporate sector in India to operate in a regulatory 
environment of best international practice that fosters 
   175  As stated by the 
Ministry of Corporate Affairs, the 
in construction and provides flexibility to respond to the rapid 
changes in the business environment while incorporating some of 
the best practices in the field of corporate regulation.176  It imposes 
Annual General Meeting (AGM)could gain traction with the Companies Bill 
. 
170 See Armour & Lele, supra        
    see also 
The Companies Bill 2009, Bill No. 5 of 2009 (India), available at 
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/actsbills/pdf/Companies_Bill_2009_24Aug20
09.pdf [hereinafter India Companies Bill 2009]. 
171See Press Release, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Preparing for Indian 
Corporates to Play Global, PRESS INFO. BUREAU, GOVT OF INDIA (Dec. 24, 2009, 17:18 
IST), http://www.pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=56471 (explaining that the 
new Companies Bill originally introduced in Parliament during 2008 lapsed for 
parliamentary reasons, and then it was reintroduced as Companies Bill 2009) see 
also Press Release, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Promoting the Growth of the Indian 
Corporate Sector Through Enlightened Regulations, PRESS INFO. BUREAU, GOVT OF 
INDIA (Dec. 23, 2010, 16:40 IST), http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=68664 
[hereinafter Promoting] (stating that the Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Finance successfully completed its examination in August 2010). 
172 Promoting, supra note 171. 
173 See generally India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170. 
174 Timothy G. Massad,      
Implications for U.S. Investors and Corporations, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE,
DOING BUISNESS IN INDIA 2009, at 33, 42 (2009) (highlighting the Companies Bill, 
2008 and other recent reforms and developments in India). 
175 Press Release, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Companies Bill, 2008 
Introduced in Lok Sabha: Bill Intends to Modernize Structure for Corporate Regulation in 
the Country, PRESS INFO. BUREAU, GOVT OF INDIA (Oct. 23, 2008, 13:20 IST), 
http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=44114. 
176 Promoting, supra note 171. 
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stricter corporate governance provisions, including disclosure and 
accountability requirements as well as an independent director 
requirement.177  In addition,     
new Companies Bill as providing protection of minority 
shareholder rights and enabling groups of shareholders to take 
legal action.178     
facilities eGovernance in company processes, recognizes the 
liability of Boards . . . [and] provides for a new scheme for 
penalties and punishment for non compliance or violation of the 
179
Under the new Companies Bill, shareholders may seek judicial 
         
company have been or are being conducted in a manner prejudicial 
to public interest or in a manner prejudicial or oppressive to him or 
    180  They may also apply for 
redress if: 
the material change, not being a change brought about by, 
or in the interests of, any creditors, including debenture 
holders or any class of shareholders of the company, has 
taken place in the management or control of the company, 
whether by an alteration in the Board of Directors, or 

it has no share capital, in its membership, or in any other 
manner whatsoever, and that by reason of such change, it is 
likely that the affairs of the company will be conducted in a 
manner prejudicial to its interests or its members or any 
class of members . . . .181
177 See Indian Companies Bill 2009 Likely to be Enacted by Year End, supra note 
169 
stricter corporate governance norms is expected to be enacted by the end of this 

178 See id. he new legislation . . . will also protect the rights of the 
minority shareholders, [and] bring about responsible selfregulation with 

179 Press Release         Bill 
Intends to Modernize Structure for Corporate Regulation in the Country (Oct. 23, 
2008), available at http://www.pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=44114.  See 
generally KMPG, COMPANIES BILL 2008 available at http://www.in.kpmg.com 
/TL_Files/Pictures/CompaniesBill_08_p.pdf (containing a summary of the most 

180 India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170, § 212(1)(a). 
181 Id. § 212(1)(b). 
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These provisions for oppression and change in shares within the 
        
direct shareholder litigation. 
The new Companies Bill resembles shareholder derivative 
actions in the United States to the extent that it permits lawsuits for 
mismanagement.  This resemblance is solidified by the new 

including duties of care, loyalty, and good faith that are virtually 
identical to the MBCA provisions adopted by a majority of states in 
the United States: 
(2) A director of a company shall act in good faith in order 
to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole, and in the best interest of the 
company. 
(3) A director of a company shall exercise his duties with 
due and reasonable care, skill and diligence. 
(4) A director of a company shall not involve in a situation 
in which he may have a direct or indirect interest that 
conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interest of the 
company. 
(5) A director of a company shall not achieve or attempt to 
achieve any undue gain or advantage either to himself or to 
his relatives, partners, or associates.182
The new Companies Bill further provides that directors 

shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to five 
183  In addition, any 
director who receives undue gains must pay those gains to the 
company.184
Only certain shareholders in Indian corporations, however, will 
have the ability to apply for a judicial remedy.  When a company 
has a share capital, at least one hundred members or onetenth of 
the total number of its members, whichever is less, or members 
182 Id. § 147. 
183 Id. § 147(7).  See generally THE CURRENCY CONVERTER, 
http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited February 25, 2011) (providing 
the conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 lakh rupee equals 
100,000 rupees). 
184 India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170, § 147. 
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holding at least onetenth of the issued share capital may apply for 
a judicial remedy.185  If a company does not have a share capital, 
then the members must total at least onefifth of the total 
membership to seek redress.186  The new Companies Bill then states 
that the Tribunal can waive these ownership requirements upon an 
application by the shareholders.187  These ownership requirements 
and the ability of the Tribunal to waive such requirements 
resemble the bond provisions required by several U.S. states.  
Those states impose an ownership requirement as a means of 
waiving a bond requirement, but the new Companies Bill does not 

expenses.  In addition, no court in the United States requires that 
the plaintiff obtain consent to sue from the other shareholders, 
whereas the new Companies Bill seems to require such consent 
when it states that if one shareholder can make the required 
ownership showing, it can get consent to sue on behalf of the other 
shareholders.188
panies Bill appear 
broader that those permitted in the United States.  In addition to 
interim orders,189 if the Tribunal thinks that the affairs have been 
conducted in an unlawful manner and winding up the company 
would hurt other members, it has a wide range of remedies:  

          

restrict transfers of company shares and terminate or set aside 
agreements between the company and a director if the Tribunal 
finds it just and equitable.190  Further, the Tribunal has the power 
to set aside any transfer, delivery of goods, payment, execution or 
   ty within three months 
before the application.191  Similar to powers granted to the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Tribunal may remove 
any director from office.192  The Tribunal, however, also has the 
185 Id. § 215(1)(a). 
186 Id. § 215(1)(b). 
187 Id. § 215(1). 
188 Id. § 215(2). 
189 Id. § 213(4). 
190 Id. § 213(2)(a)(f). 
191 Id. § 213(2)(g). 
192 Id. § 213(2)(h). 
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power to appoint new directors, to dictate how new managers are 
to be elected, and to impose any other equitable remedy.193  Finally, 
the Tribunal may impose costs.194  This could mean that a winning 
shareholder may be able to recover their litigation costs, just as can 
a winning shareholder in the United States.  However, this 
provision could also be read to impose costs upon the losing party, 
which would be contrary to the American Rule.  It also is unclear 
         This 
uncertainty may deter shareholders from filing derivative lawsuits.
The new Companies Bill also permits a member or creditor to 
seek a class action remedy if they believe that management is being 
conducted in a manner prejudicial to the company, members, or 
195  The class may seek an order on the following:  
restrain an ultra vires act restrain the company from committing 
breach of its articles void a resolution altering the articles restrain 
action on a resolution restrain the company from doing any act 
contrary to its provisions or restrain the company from taking 
action contrary to a passed resolution.196  Any such order is 
binding and failure to comply is punishable with a fine for the 
company between five lakh rupees and twentyfive lakh rupees 
($11,000 to $55,000 in U.S. dollars).197  Every officer involved may 
be punished by up to three years in prison or a fine between 
twentyfive thousand rupees to one lakh rupees ($550 to $2,200 in 
U.S. dollars), or both.198
193 Id. § 213(2)(i)(l). 
194 Id. § 213(2)(k). 
195 Id. § 216. 
196 Id. § 216(1)(a)(f). 
197 Id. § 216(23).  See generally THE CURRENCY CONVERTER, 
http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited February 25, 2011) (providing 
the conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 lakh rupee equals 
100,000 rupees). 
198 India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170, § 216(3).  See generally THE 
CURRENCY CONVERTER, http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited February 
25, 2011) (providing the conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 
lakh rupee equals 100,000 rupees). 
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4. CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION IN CHINA 
In 1700, China had 23.1% of the world income.199  China 
established the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1905, and it was the 
largest stock exchange in Asia until 1941.200  After the Chinese 
         
Republic        
became creating a centrally planned economy.201  By the end of the 
1950s, the government had taken control of all businesses and 
closed the stock exchanges.202  Thus, corporations as they are 
known in the United States disappeared. 
       203  In 
December 1990, the PRC reestablished the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to raise capital for 
Chinese companies.204  By 2008    were the 
second largest in Asia after Japan.205  As of April 2009, there were 
         
capitalization of RMB16.9 trillion (over $2.5 trillion in U.S. 
199 JAIRAM RAMESH, MAKING SENSE OF CHINDIA: REFLECTIONS ON CHINA AND 
INDIA 57 (2005). 
200 See Chenxia Shi, Protecting Investors in China Through Multiple Regulatory 
Mechanisms and Effective Enforcement, 24 ARIZ. J. INTL & COMP. L. 451, 46668 (2007)
(providing a brief histo     see also Yuwa Wei, The 
Development of the Securities Market and Regulations in China, 27 LOY. L.A. INTL &
COMP. L. REV.           
market in Asia: the Shanghai Stock Exch For a chronology of the Shanghai 
      generally W.A. THOMAS, WESTERN 
CAPITALISM IN CHINA: A HISTORY OF THE SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (2001) see also
LI CHANGJIANG (李长江), ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG DE LISHI HE FAZHAN 
(中国证券市场的历史与发展) [THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHINAS SECURITY 
MARKET] 3 (1998) (). 
201 Wei, supra note 200, at 488. 
202 See id. 
see also Cindy A. 
Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now, 2002 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 66 (2002)       
corporations gradually disappeared.  This was due to importation of the highly 
centralized economy model f
203 Wei, supra note 200, at 488 (citing ZHU SANZHU, SECURITIES REGULATION IN 
CHINA 5 (2000)). 
204 Xiao Huang, Shareholder Revolt: The Statutory Derivative Action in China
COMP. RES. IN L. & POL. ECON. (CLPE Research Paper 49/2009, Vol. 05, No. 09), 
2009, at 45, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1516448.
205 Marlon A. Layton, Note, Is Private Securities Litigation Essential for the 
, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1948, 1963 (2008). 
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dollars).206  One unusual aspect of Chinese capital markets is the 
large number of small investors.  Small investors, defined as 
investors with less than RMB1 million (approximately $150,000 in 
U.S. dollars) in cash or shares, account for 99% of the total number 
of capital accounts.207  These shareholders tend to have relatively 
short investing periods and trade frequently, resulting in an 
average turnover rate that is seven times higher than rates in 
mature markets.208  This high turnover rate has fueled a view that 
       
investments.209
4.1. Corporate Legal Structure in China 
To understand how the Chinese markets work, one must 
understand the unusual corporate structures in China. China 
currently has both stateowned enterprises (SOEs) and private 
companies.  These corporate structures have evolved over time. 
4.1.1.  
From 1950 to 1984, companies in China were organized as 
traditional SOEs with the State wholly owning the SOEs and 
exerting management control over them.210  The traditional model 
206 Huang, supra note 204, at 5.  RMB represents the China Yuan, renminbi or 
   RMB GUIDE, http://www.rmbguide.com/ (last visited 
February 20, 2011).  For the conversion of RMB to U.S. dollars, see Renminbi
Currency Converter, CHINABILITY, http://www.chinability.com 
/renminbiconverter.htm (last visited February 25, 2011).
207 Huang, supra note 204, at 5 (citing the figures of Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
between January, 2007 and March, 2007, in: Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli 
Weiyuanhui (中国证券监督管理委员会) [CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMMN],
ZHONGGUO ZIBEN SHICHANG FAZHAN BAOGAO (中国资本市场发展报告) [CHINA 
CAPITAL MARKETS DEVELOPMENT REPORT], at 269 (2008)).
208 See id.
209 See Barry Livett, Securities Industry Faces Challenge, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 25, 
see also Xin 
Zhiming, Stock Market Causes Heated Debate, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 13, 2001 
(h       
contributes to the casinolike qualities of the stock market).  But cf. Li Xiang & Jiao 
Xiaoyang, Rise of New Generation of Investors, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 18, 2010 (arguing 
that an expanding group of young investors is becoming more sophisticated and 
focusing on higher yields, rather than viewing the stock market as a casino for 
quick profits).  
210 Schipani & Liu, supra note 202, at 5     
governance could also be referred to as the Stateownership model, or the State
owned and managed model . . . .  Not only did the State have ownership of all the 
property of the SOEs, but it also enjoyed managerial powe
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depressed private sector growth and deprived the country of 
economic independence because it firmly bound the State, SOEs, 
and employees to each other.211
From 1984 to 1993, the SOE form morphed from the traditional 
model to the transitional model.212  The goal of the change was that 
        
authority and full responsibility for their own profits and 
213  In 1988, China enacted the SOEs Law, which resulted in 
three important changes:  (1) allowed SOEs to be run on a dayto
day basis by the factory or company director (2) provided for local 
and central government supervision of the enterprise and (3) 
created democratic management, such as allowing trade unions.214
The 1988 SOEs Law decreased government intervention and 
allowed enterprises to function semiautonomously, but the 
transitional model ultimately failed to provide the desired level of 
reforms.215
4.1.2.  
, called for a market 
economy in China.216 
modern corporate system] in the majority of backbone large and 
medium 217  To achieve that goal, China enacted the 
1993 Company Law, which provided the foundation for SOEs to 
transform into stateowned corporations, closely held corporations, 
211 Id. at 6, 8. 
212 Id. 
the State
213 Id. at 89 (quoting a Chinese Communist Party Decision). 
214 Id. at 910. 
215 Id. at 11.  
First, it was very difficult to identify a reasonable minimum amount of 
profit for the SOEs to pay to the State.  Second, although most SOEs 
enjoyed benefits when they were profitable, they were unable to pay the 
fixed amounts required to the State when they sustained losses.  Third, 
there was a fair amount of exploitation of the assets of SOEs for personal 
use.  Finally, too little SOE profits were retained for development 
purposes, leaving insufficient resources for future expansion. 
Id. 
216 Id. at 12. 
217 Id. at 12 (quoting 15th CPC Central Committee, Decision on SOEs Reform) 
(internal footnote omitted). 
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or publicly held corporations.218  The 1993 Company Law requires 
corporations to have three governing bodies: (1) shareholders that 
        ng (2) a board of 
directors and (3) a board of supervisors.219  Although shareholders 
act as a body at annual meetings of U.S. corporations, corporations 
in the United States have only a single board of directors.  This 
twotier board system is somewhat similar to the German system 
with a board of directors and a supervisory board, except unlike in 
the Germany system there is no hierarchy between the boards and 
both boards are appointed by shareholders.220  As with most U.S. 
corporations, Chinese companies must also have a chief executive 
officer and a chair of the board of directors.221
SOEs continue to exist in China and are governed by the 1988 
SOEs Law and the 1993 Company Law.  SOEs must now meet the 
following requirements:   clearly establish ownership (2) 
provide welldefined rights and responsibilities (3) separate the 
enterprise from the government and (4) employ principles of 
222  SOEs may now have shareholders and 
these shareholders receive rights that are similar to those possessed 
by U.S. shareholders, including rights in proportion to the number 
of shares they own, entitlement to dividends and to net assets if the 
corporation is liquidated, and limited liability.223  While the goal of 
modern SOEs is to promote separation between the government 
and the enterprise, this has been difficult to fully achieve.224
       
experienced an unprecedented wave of corporatization and 
privatis225  Approximately 80% of small and mediumsized 
218 Id. at 13 Wei, supra note 200, at 492. 
219 Schipani & Liu, supra note 202, at 14. 
220 See id. at 1516 (noting that in Germany the supervisory board oversees 
the board of directors and that the members of the board of directors are 
appointed by, and may be dismissed by, the supervisory board). 
221 See id. at 14 (noting that these were two new statutory corporate 
positions). 
222 Id. at 22. 
223 See id. at 2223 
. 
224 See id. at 2328 (noting that some SOEs are not holding shareholder 
meetings, some have not established boards of directors, and the government is 
 in fifty). 
225 Wei, supra note 200, at 492. 
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SOEs have become corporate entities.226  There are two types of 
nonstateowned companies recognized by Chinese law:  closely 
held corporations and publicly held corporations, but these two 
types have a variety of subcategories.227  There are different rules 
on the corporate composition for these two main categories and 
their corresponding subcategories.228  Both forms of corporations 
are organized and controlled under the Company Law.229  While 
China now has individual investors, twothirds of outstanding 
shares of most public corporations are still nontradable, state
owned shares.230  In 2005, the government began nontradable 
share reform, but the reforms have not been as effective as hoped, 
because only 28% of shares were tradable as of August 2008.231
China has passed laws and reformed the SOEs to introduce 
private corporations and to allow SOEs to have private control.  
These reforms give the appearance that the current structure of 
SOEs is being supplanted by a corporate ownership structure 
similar to U.S. corporations.  The government, however, continues 
to play a key role in Chinese corporations and the securities 
markets, so the transition is not yet complete. 
4.1.3.  Corporate Governance in China 
       
corporate governance rules.  One, China suffers from insider 
control, which leads to mismanagement and assetstripping.232
Not only do mismanagement and assetstripping loot the 
government due to its large corporate holdings, but they also 
discourage private investment and results in a loss of capital.233
226 Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 14647 (2006). 
227 Schipani & Liu, supra note 202, at 16. 
228 See id. at 1622 (describing some of the subcategories of each corporation 
and briefly explaining the governing rules). 
229 Clarke, supra note 226, at 146. 
230 Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 56 see also Hui Huang, The Statutory 
Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 4
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 227, 233 (2007) (noting that traditionally more than 60% of all 
outstanding shares in listed companies were nontradable, stateowned shares).
231 Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 6. 
232 Clarke, supra note 226, at 147148. 
233 See id. at 148.  
If management commits waste and fraud at the expense of shareholders, 
this is obviously of direct concern to the state because of its large stake in 
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Second, many Chinese corporations have majority shareholders 
that dominate minority shareholders.234  A 2002 selfreporting 
study by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and 
the State Economic and Trade Commission showed that 40% of 
companies completed relatedparty transactions with their ten 
largest shareholders.235
To remedy these concerns, various governmental entities have 
created a number of confusing and potentially conflicting 
guidelines and requirements.  Some Chinese regional governments 
have passed corporate governance policy statements and guidance 
documents calling for a specified number of independent directors 
on each board.236  Similarly, central government agencies such as 
the Ministry of 
guidelines requiring independent directors on corporate boards.237
In 2001, the CSRC issued the Guidance Opinion on the 
Establishment of an Independent Director System in Listed 
Companies, which called for independent directors for listed 
companies.238  The CSRC has also issued guidelines on corporate 
governance.  
        
listed companies to adopt provisions with the exact or similar 
wording of the CSRC guidelines.239  In January 2002, the CSRC 
      
the enterprises being looted.  But it is also a government concern where 
the state is not a significant shareholder because in addition to damaging 
individual (and institutional) shareholders, mismanagement and asset
stripping will, by discouraging investment in corporations, raise the cost 
of capital in the economy generally and hinder growth. 
Id. 
234 See id. (stating      
management).  
235 Id. party transaction is not, of course, necessarily a transaction 
on unfair terms to the company, but given the lack of institutional safeguards that 
might ensure fair terms, there are legitimate grounds 
236 See id. at 17880 (discussing various 
reform efforts). 
237 Id. at 18081. 
238 See id. at 12829 Guanyu 
zai Shangshi Gongsi Jinali Duli Dongshi Zhidua de Zhidao Yijan [Guidance Opinion on 
the Establishment of an Independent Director System in Listed Companies] § 1(1), issued 
Aug. 16, 2001). 
239 Id. at 183. 
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provisions appear weak.240  While it is unclear whether 
implementing the Corporate Governance Principles is mandatory, 
companies that do not conform to them must disclose to what 
extent their practices do not conform and the CSRC could pressure 
companies to change their practices.241
4.2. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China 
As discussed above, when the Chinese Communist Party came 
to power, the government took control of all businesses and they 
became SOEs.  The government owned and served as the ultimate 
management for those enterprises.  Shareholder litigation thus was 
        
government. 
4.2.1.  Shareholder Litigation in China before 2005 
China instituted various corporate governance reforms and a 
shareholder protection system in its 1993 Company Law.  The 1993 
Company Law, however, only provided weak shareholder 
remedies and did not directly address shareholder derivative 
242  In the 1993 Company Law, 
Article 111 was the only provision granting shareholders the right 
to bring a legal action: 
If a resolution adopted b   
committee or the board of directors violates the relevant 
national statutes or administrative regulations, or infringes 
rights and interests of shareholders, a shareholder is 
240 See id. at 184. (noting that the provisions relating to independent directors 
are weak because they do not require independent directors, providing instead 
only that the company may establish independent directors in accordance with its 
needs nor do the provisions       
di
241 Id. at 186, 18889.  Among other things, the Principles require companies 
to establish an independent director system, but the Principles do not provide 
clear rules on how ma       
board.  Id. at 18889.
242 Id. see also Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 6 Company Law 1993 
barely played any role in preventing misconduct by the controlling shareholders 

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oin such 
illegal act or infringing act.243
Article 111 failed to explicitly allow shareholder derivate 
lawsuits and judicial decisions on Article 111 created complex 
procedures for shareholders to bring a lawsuit.244
Even if Article 111 allowed derivative lawsuits, the only 
available remedy was an injunction, not compensation.245  In 
addition, if a shareholder wished to sue, the defendants and the 
harm (infringement on shareholder rights) provided by the 1993 
Law   246  Despite these limitations, 
shareholders and company representatives did attempt to bring 
lawsuits under Article 111, but the lawsuits never reached a 
judicial decision.247  For example, an investor sued the directors of 
Sanjiu Medical & Pharmaceutical Co., but the court dismissed the 
lawsuit finding that the legal interests of the shareholders as a 
whole should be represented in a shareholder derivative action, 
and thus the investor needed consent from all shareholders before 
suing.248
Before the 2005 Company Law, shareholders lacked a clear 
provision to sue a company when its directors or officers 
committed a scandal.249  Thus, directors and officers committed 
many corporate scandals without any consequence e]xcept for a 
public criticism by the CSRC.250  For example, during the 1996 to 
243 Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 7 (quoting the Company Law, Article 111 
(1993)). 
244 See Jiong Deng, Note, Building an InvestorFriendly Shareholder Derivative 
Lawsuit System in China, 46 HARV. INTL L.J. 347, 356 (2005) (explaining that Article 
111 provides for direct actions, but it is not clear that it provides for shareholder 
derivative actions) see also Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 7 (stating that Article 
              

245 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 7 (noting that the only shareholder 

246 Id.
247 See Deng, supra note 244, at 365, 372 (highlighting difficulties encountered 
in the course of shareholder derivative litigation). 
248 Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 11. 
249 See Guanghua Yu, Towards an Institutional Competition Model of Comparative 
Corporate Governance Studies, 6 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 31, 4243 (2003) (describing 
the difficulty individual shareholders encountered in attempting to sue 
           
). 
250 Id. at 42. 
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1998 time period, the Shanghai Jiabao Industrial Group Co. 
engaged in illegal speculative trading of shares in other 
companies.251  The Company used more than 300 individual 
accounts to circumvent a government ban on trading and 
introduced RMB228 million (about $34 million in U.S. dollars) in 
primary and secondary markets through its activities.252  After an 
investigation, the CSRC imposed a minimal administrative fine on 
the chairman (RMB50,000 or about $7,500 in U.S. dollars), seized 
the  mall trading gains (RMB840,000 or just over 
$125,000 in U.S. dollars), and publicly criticised the [] 
directors.253  In 2001, a controlling shareholder of the Sanjiu 
Medical & Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd inappropriately used RMB2.5 
billion of company funds (about $380 million in U.S. dollars), 
254  The board of 
directors did not approve the use of the funds by the controlling 
shareholder.255  The CSRC publicly criticized the company, but no 
other action was brought against the controlling shareholder 
because of the lack of clear provisions on shareholder derivative 
lawsuits at the time.256  The list of corporate scandals goes on.257
In 2003, however, the shareholder derivative action was 
introduced to China through its courts.  The  
Court issued its Opinion on Some Issues in Trials for Legal Actions 
Related to Company Dispute (No. 1) in 2003, setting up the first rules 
for derivative actions.258  Shortly afterwards, the Jiangsu High 
 ssued its Opinion on Some Issues in Trials for Legal 
Actions Applied with Company Law (Provisional Rules),  up 
251 Id. at 43. 
252 Id.  For the conversion of RMB to U.S. dollars, see Real Time Renminbi
(Chinese yuan) Currency Converter, CHINABILITY, http://www.chinability.com 
/renminbiconverter.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2011). 
253 Yu, supra note 249, at 43. 
254 See id.         
sharehol        
faced). 
255 See id.  
board had not approved the controlling sharehol    

256 See id. at 4243 
. 
257 See id. at 4047 (exploring and listing multiple incidents of questionable 
corporate activities in China). 
258 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 12 (citing this as the opinion in which 

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the rules for shareholder representative actions.259  In 2003, the 
    published the first draft of 
Regulations on Some Issues Concerning Trials for Company Dispute (No 
1) and allowed for public comment.260  This laid the foundation 
for the changes in shareholder protections within the 2005 
Company Law. 
4.2.2.  Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China after 2005 
After experiencing corporate scandals and realizing the need 
for stronger shareholder protection, China enacted the 2005 
Company Law, which included a provision expressly allowing 
shareholder derivative litigation.  The CSRC adopted new policies 
in the 2005 Company Law based on the theory that a correlation 
exists between capital market development and shareholder 
protection.261  In order to increase capital in the Chinese markets, 
CSRC thus agreed to increase shareholder protections in the 2005 
Company Law.262  Meilun Shi, former CSRC vice chairman, noted 
the importance of strong shareholder protection in order for the 
markets to function:  
         
markets.  They have a direct impact on the successful 
implementation of reform and the OpenDoor Policy, as well as on 
 263  In 2000, the thencurrent CSRC chairperson 
stated that investor protection was the top priority for the CSRC.264
Additionally, authorities were concerned about protecting 
minority shareholders.  Given the high percentage of stateowned 
shares, minority shareholders were relatively powerless before 
259 Id.
260 Id.  For a discussion of the Supreme   
2005, see id. at 12. 
261 Id. at 5.  For the 2005 Company Law, see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Gongsi Fa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Co. Law of the PRepublic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, revised 
Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 152 (Isinolaw) (China) [hereinafter 
Chinese 2005 Company Law]. 
262 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 56 (describing the focus on investor 
.
263 Deng, supra note 244, at 349. 
264 See id. at 349 n.13 (discussing a statement made by Zhou Xiaochuan, the 
chairperson of CSRC ). 
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2005.265  Unlike the United States, Canada, and England, China 
lacked an effective remedy for oppressed minority shareholders, 
and thus a shareholder derivative action could play a more 
important role in China than in other countries.266  The lack of a 
shareholder remedy contributed to the weak corporate 
governance system in China, especially in protecting minority 
shareholders.267
Chinese government officials and commentators also believed 
that a shareholder derivative lawsuit would promote better 
corporate governance in China.268  Given the role of derivative 
lawsuits in the United States and their impact on corporate 
      
China had to institute a shareholder derivative system.269
The statutory shareholder derivative device created by the 2005 
Company Law is similar in some respects to the MBCA in the 
United States as well as recent statutory enactments in England 
and Canada.270  Article 150 of the 2005 Company Law states 
director, a supervisor, or any senior officer shall be liable for any 
losses of the company if he/she violates any provisions of laws, or 
administrative regulations, or the articles of [association] of the 
company in performance of his/her  271  While 
Article 150 does not state if minority shareholders can sue majority 
shareholders, it appears that a controlling shareholder, who 
violates the interests of the company and causes losses through this 
265 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 56 (noting the large percentage of 
stateowned shares in comparison to the percentage of tradable shares, especially 

266 See id. at 6        
. 
267 Yu, supra note 249, at 56. 
268 See Deng, supra note 244, at 355 
       

269 Id. See generally Guanghua Yu, 
Owned Enterprises: Of Takeovers and Securities Fraud, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 339, 340
(2004) (exploring the potential benefits of using Western laws on takeovers and 
securities fraud to diminish the inefficiencies related to Chinese SOEs). 
270 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 1  
derivative law as bei
271 Id. at 7. 
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violation, can be subject to a shareholder derivative lawsuit under 
Article 152.272
Article 152 of the 2005 Company Law contains procedural rules 
that distinguish between companies limited by shares (public 
companies) and closely held companies.273  In order to file a 
derivative action, p    
alone or jointly, more than 1% 
180 consecutive days before filing an action.274  For a closely held 
company, no minimum ownership interests or time constraints are 
imposed, presumably because abusive shareholder derivative 
actions are considered rare in such firms.275  As in the case of India, 
this ownership requirement for public corporations is similar to 
those of bond statutes adopted by some U.S. states, although India 
does not impose a bond requirement.  Even if shareholders meet 
the ownership requirements, they face financial disincentives 
because China, like the United States, follows the rule that each 
party bears its 276
Similar to the demand requirement developed in U.S. law, 
Article 152 of the 2005 Company Law specifically describes three 
circumstances in which shareholders may commence a derivative 
lawsuit.  First, shareholders demand that a governing body of the 
272 See id. (explaining that while Chinese law does not expressly provide for 
derivative suits against a controlling shareholder, Article 152 of the 2005 
Company Law may nevertheless allow it in certain circumstances). 
273 See id. at 8  d by shares (CLS) 

274 See id. (listing the specific standing requirements for all shareholders 
wishing to sue under Article 152 of the 2005 Company Law). 
275 See id. (suggesting that stringent standing requirements may not be 
required for closely held limited liability companies because the more public the 
company, the greater the need for legislation regarding corporate governance) 
(citing Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of 
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 178485 (2004)). 
276 In China, the losing party bears courtdetermined filing and litigation fees.  
Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 9 (citing Measures on 
   Acceptance of Litigation Fees 1989, art. 19).  Accord Donald C. 
Clarke, The Private AttorneyGeneral in China: Potential and Pitfalls, 8 WASH. U.
GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 241, 253 (2009) (the general 
rule is ) Virginia E. Harper Ho, From 
Contracts to Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation U
Legislation, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35, 1fee
shifting rule on attorney fees, although court costs are borne either by the losing 
.  Cf. Elizabeth Ann Hunt, Note, Made in China: Who Bears the Loss 
and Why?, 27 PENN ST. INTL L. REV. 915, 920 (2009) (explaining that 
and low damage awards deter many Chinese citizens from filing claims ).
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company brings an action and that body refuses.277  Second, the 
governing body fails to raise a lawsuit within 30 days 
receiving the  request.278  Third, if urgent 
circumstances exist where the failure to implement a legal action 
would cause   to the interests of the 
company279  This formulation of the demand requirement clearly 
resembles the MBCA provision adopted by many U.S. states.280
In April 2006, tof China issued the 
Provisions of Several Issues Concerning the Application of the PRC 
Company Law,  initial interpretation of the 2005 
Company Law and addresses some of the procedural issues in 
shareholder derivative actions.281  In addition to the 2005 Company 
Law, the CSRC has issued numerous regulations to improve 
corporate governance and increase shareholder rights.282  For 
example, the 2002 Corporate Governance Code empowers 
shareholders to take legal action when a board or shareholder 
meeting violates shareholder rights or violates laws or 
administrative regulations.283
277 See Chinese 2005 Company Law, supra note 261, art. 152 (stating the 
specific requirements for bringing a derivative suit in China). 
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2008). 
No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) a 
written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable 
action and (2) 90 days have expired from the date delivery of the 
demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that 
the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable 
injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 
90day period. 
Id. 
281 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 12
Court announced that this guidance would be introduced in several installments 
so forthcoming interpretations may explain additional procedures). 
282 For a listing of these guidelines, see id. at 10. 
Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies 1997, General 
Requir       , 
Guidelines for Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed 
Companies 2001, The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies 2002, and the Regulations for the Protection of Individual 
2004. 
Id. 
283 See id. at 1011 (citing Zhengjianfa No.1 of 2002 [Code of Corp. Governance for 
Listed Cos.] (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, Jan. 7, 2001, 
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Nothing in the 2005 Company Law, however, addresses the 
substantive fiduciary duties of directors.284  Thus it remains unclear 
what duties directors owe to the company and when they have 
violated those duties.  One commentator observed that 
law and regulatory practice remains unclear on the issue of 
standards of liability for independent directors, and indeed for 
directors in 285  Shareholder derivative actions filed under 
the 2005 Company Law, however, may flesh out such duties as a 
means of further promoting corporate governance reform in 
China.286
5. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION FOR INVESTORS IN INDIAN AND CHINESE
CORPORATIONS 
As Sections 2 and 3 discussed, both India and China have taken 
substantial steps toward establishing free market economies since 
the mid1980s.  India has abandoned the Fabian socialism that it 
had adopted following its independence from England in 1947.  
Similarly, China has moved away from its centrally planned 
economy that the Communist Chinese Party implemented after 
gaining power in the 1940s.  As part of the process of moving 
toward free markets, both countries have decreased state control of 
corporations by increasing private ownership within existing 
corporate structures and by encouraging entrepreneurship.  Both 
countries have also replaced central government control of their 
stock exchanges and developed market oriented mechanisms to 
encourage capital formation.  More recently, both countries have 
moved to recognize shareholder derivative lawsuits.  Section 5.1 
addresses the rationales for this change and the basis for the 
specific derivative device chosen by each country.   Section 5.2 then 
effective Jan. 7, 2001), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release 
/200708/t20070810_69223.htm, art. 4 (China). 
284 See Chao Xi, In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model: Board Reforms 
and the Political Economy of Corporate Law in China, 22 CONN. J. INTL L. 1, 2223 
(2007) (suggesting that the 2005 Company Law would be improved by detailing 
the substance of the general duties of loyalty and due diligence that directors owe 
to the company) (citing Chinese 2005 Company Law, supra note 261, art. 148). 
285 Clarke, supra note 226, app. 1 at 224.  
286 See Deng, supra note 244, at 355 (supporting the idea that although China 
          

. 
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discusses the potential problems that India will face in 
implementing effective shareholder derivative litigation.  Section 
5.3 discusses the likely implementation problems for shareholder 
derivative actions in China. 
5.1. The Rationales for Recognizing Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits 
Within the evolving global economy, corporations must 
compete to raise capital from investors.  Many investors want to 
invest in foreign corporations and entire investment companies are 
devoted to investing in international markets and emerging 
markets specifically.287  Indeed, in the everincreasing global 
economy, investors in the developed world are now investing 
significant amounts of capital into emerging economies.288  Foreign 
institutional investor
from $25 billion in 1990 to $300 billion in 2005.289
Naturally
to invest in foreign and emerging markets.  Both countries have 
already taken many steps to attract foreign investors, including 
modernization of their corporate legal structures and their stock 
exchanges.  The motivating force for now accepting the 
shareholder derivative device appears to be a desire to increase 
protections for shareholders, especially minority shareholders, as a 
means of attracting more foreign capital investments.  In addition, 
recognizing shareholder derivative lawsuits is a method for 
    
287 See, e.g., INTL FIN. CORP., FUNDING OPERATIONS 3 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/treasury.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/RoadShowPresenta
tionSept2009/$FILE/FUNDING+PRESENTATION+September2009.pdf. 
(showing a presentation of the International Finance Corporation that includes 
details on its fu        
    see also ISI EMERGING MARKETS, 
http://www.securities.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2011) (providing data on 
emerging international markets). 
288 See generally P. Krishna Prasanna, Foreign Institutional Investors: Investment 
Preference in India, 3 J. ADMIN. & GOVERNANCE, 40, 41 (2008), available at
http://www.joaag.com/uploads/4_PrasannaFinal3_2_.pdf (detailing how 
transnational capitalism has led to a significant flow of capital from developed 
countries to emerging economies, like in India). 
289 Todd Moss et al., nvestment? Frontier 
Stock Markets, Firm Size and Asset Allocation of Global Emerging Market Funds 1 (Ctr. 
for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 112, 2007), available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/12773/. 
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corporate entities and capital markets, thus increasing domestic 
investments within their corporate structures. 
As described in Section 3.2    
Affairs has described its proposed shareholder derivative device as 
providing protection for minority shareholder rights.  Empowering 
investors to bring shareholder derivative actions potentially gives 
minority shareholders the power to protect themselves.  The 
provision of  Companies Bill that enables shareholders 
to take legal action, however, is not well defined.  The provision 
does not delineate the causes of action for which derivative actions 
may be instituted beyond oppression, mismanagement, and 
changes to share rights, as explained in Section 3.2.  Further, the 
new Companies Bill defines standards of conduct for directors by 
stating the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith that are 
similar to those defined in U.S. states adopting the MBCA.  
However, it does not empower shareholders to file derivative 
actions for a breach of those duties nor does it define how those 
duties could be breached.  Despite the similar definition of 
        
closely resemble the shareholder derivative laws of either the 
United States or England.290  The new Companies Bill thus appears 
to adopt the shareholder derivative device, but without sufficient 
definition to truly enable minority shareholders to protect 
themselves.  This is but one of many problems that India faces in 
implementing shareholder derivative litigation Section 5.2 will 
explain other practical problems of implementation. 


described in Section 4.2.2.  China had a unique concern for 
minority shareholders, given the continuing high percentage of 
stateowned shares even within private corporations.  It also 
expressed a belief that empowering shareholders to file derivative 
lawsuits on behalf of corporations would improve corporate 
governance.      
provisions resemble the MBCA adopted by many U.S. states, as 
well as the recent statutory enactments in England and Canada.  
Perhaps this is not surprising since so many lawyers and 
bureaucrats in China are trained in the United States and 
290 Compare India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170, with Companies Act,
2006, c. 46, §§ 260264 (U.K.) (specifying circumstances under which a court will 
authorize a derivative claim in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland). 
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England.291 
similar to those that have been well tested in the United States, 
putting shareholder derivative litigation in practice will prove 
extremely dif
5.2. Problems Implementing Effective Shareholder Litigation in India 
While India has adopted many new corporate governance 
laws, such as Article 49, that seem to provide strong rights on 
paper, India struggles with effective enforcement.   
country known for vigorous enforcement of legislation.  Thus far, 
the enforcement of [Article 49] has mirrored the lax enforcement 
292  While Article 49 went 
into effect in 2001, it took six years before the SEBI brought its first 
enforcement action293 despite a record of noncompliance with its 
provisions.294  The weak enforcement of Article 49 may be 
explained by the lack of provisions requiring disclosures and 
accountability to shareholders.295  Issues of ineffective enforcement 
will likely persist for the    shareholder 
derivative provisions. 
Most  legal systems are rooted in one of four legal 
systems:  English common law, French civil law, German civil law 
[or] Scandinavian civil law.296  Researchers utilize two indexes to 
compare the laws in these countries:  a shareholder rights index 
291 See generally David J. Lynch,      , 
USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2003, (Money), at 1B, available at 2003 WLNR 6107628 
(reporting on the increased numbers of Chinese students and professionals 
           
Reaping Rich Dividends, FIN. EXPRESS, Dec. 16, 2005, 
available at 2005 WLNR 20348532 (comparing successful Chinese efforts to attract 
the return of western

292 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 388. 
293 Id. at 390.  While there is weak enforcement overall, the SEBI has brought 
enforcement actions.  See id. at 39091 (outlining enforcement proceedings 
brought by the SEBI). 
294 See Dharmapala & Khanna, supra note 162, at 10 (reporting a lack of 
Article 49 enforcement actions        

295 See generally Mazumdar, supra note 153, at 254 (concluding that lack of 
 
        

296 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 89.  
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that scores countries from zero (low) to six (high), and a rule of law 
index that scores countries from zero (low) to ten (high).297  Of the 
four systems, English common law countries generally have the 
highest scores on the shareholder rights index, indicating that these 
countries offer the best protection of shareholder rights.298 
shareholder rights system scores a five, which is equal to that of 
other Englishorigin countries including the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Hong Kong, Pakistan, and South Africa, 
and better than fortytwo other countries including France, 
Germany, Japan, and Switzerland.299
India, however, scores very low on the rule of law index 
compared to other countries.300  The Scandinavianorigin countries 
had an average score of 10, the Germanorigin countries 8.68, 
Englishorigin countries 6.46, and Frenchorigin countries 6.05.301
In the rule of law index, advanced countries tend to have high 
scores on the index, while developing countries usually have low 
scores.302  India has a rule of law score of 4.17, and ranks 41 out of 
49 countries studied.303 , it appears that Indian laws provide 
        
       304
Enforcement of laws, however, plays a greater role in corporate 
governance than simply creating the laws, especially in facilitating 
security markets that are not riddled with insider trading scams.305
Like the U.S. legal system, Indian laws accord a significant 
role for the judiciary.306     
297 See id. at 9 (describing the indexes used to compare the four primary legal 
systems). 
298 See id.  
systems in the shareholder rights index with an average score .  
299 Id. see also Allen et al., supra note 116, at 12 (observing a strong degree of 
investor protections in India but finding such protection less effective in practice 
due to corruption and inefficiency). 
300 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 9. 
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id. (noting that of the fortynine countries studied, India received a score 
higher than only Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Colombia, Indonesia, 
Peru, and the Philippines). 
304 Id. at 910. 
305 See id. at 1011 (arguing that effective enforcement of shareholder 
protection laws is more essential than mere welldesigned shareholder protection 
laws on the books, which are poorly enforced). 
306 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 359. 
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slow and backlogged.  A 2001 study found that twenty million 
        
almost 22,000 in the Supreme Court.307  The results of this backlog 
are devastating for shareholders seeking a remedy.  A 2004 World 
Bank report noted that it is common to wait six years for a first 
hearing and twenty years for a final judgment.308  When India 
enacted the Companies (Second Amendment) Act in 2002, it 
created the National Company Law Tribunal and the National 
Company Law Appellate Tribunal to enforce the Companies Act 
and other related     
companies.309  While these courts were promising steps toward 
better enforcement, a recent study shows that these courts
are rarely utilized.310
Indian businesses have also shown a lack of faith in the legal 
system.  In a 2005 survey, 50% of firms surveyed said they do not 
have a regular legal advisor and of the half that does, less than 
[fifty percent] . . . have legal advisor with a law degree or a 
license to practice law.311  The majority of business leaders lacking 
a legal advisor reasoned that they did not need one because they 
trust their business partners.312     
takes a back seat while reputation, trust and informal personal 
relationships are the driving factors in screening counterparties to 
313
307 See Varun Bhat, Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present, and Suggestions 
for the Future, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1429, 144849 (2007) (citing statistics from a 2001 
). 
308 WORLD BANK & INTL MONETARY FUND, REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF 
STANDARDS AND CODES (ROSC): CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNTRY ASSESSMENT:
INDIA 6 (2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_ind.pdf.  The 
       governance 
framework, including basic rights of shareholders, disclosures, and transparency.  
Id. at 214   pliance with Organization for Economic Co
Operation and Development corporate governance principals). 
309 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 360361    
Company Law Tribunal inherited most of its powers from its predecessor the 
Company Law Board and consolidated some additional powers previously 
enforced by various government bodies) (citing the Companies (Second 
Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 11, Acts of Parliament, 2003). 
310 Id. at 361. 
311 Allen et al., supra note 116, at 2324.
312 Id.     a reason, 63% of respondents who did not 
have legal advisors claimed they did not need lawyers as they knew all their 

313 Id.
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In postindependence India, unlike most developed countries 
and typical of emerging economies, company ownership is highly 
concentrated in the hands of family business groups.314  A 2006 
study found that almost 60% 
affiliated with family business groups, and an additional 11% were 
owned, either in whole or in significant part, by the federal or state 
governments.315  In other large companies, promoters played a key 
and persuasive role in corporate finance because, after 
liberalization, many promoters owned half or more than half of the 
company.316 
      317  Dominant 
shareholders in India, such as promoters, seriously threaten 
effective corporate governance because directors become company 
insiders.318
In addition, smaller companies rarely rely on the legal system 
       rotection regime (e.g. 
ownership concentration, dividend ratio, and valuation) more than 
  319  These companies often do not seek formal 
financing sources, but rather rely on alternative funding sources 
314 See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 36263 (explaining that family 
  and a primary reason 
for a lack of disclosure and governance requirements under the Companies Act). 
315 See Rajesh Chakrabarti et al., Corporate Governance in India, 20 J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN. 59, 59 (2008) (exploring governance challenges resulting from this 
concentrated ownership). 
316 See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 36364 (observing a shift during the 
1990s where promoters began to increase their stakes in companies under their 
control) see also K.S. Chalapati Rao & Atulan Guha, Ownership Pattern of the Indian 
Corporate Sector: Implications for Corporate Governance 1, 11 (Inst. for Stud. in Indus. 
Dev., Working Paper No. 2006/09, 2006), available at 
http://isidev.nic.in/pdf/wp0609.pdf (stating that promoters own nearly half of 
total market capitalization). 
317 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 1112. 
It is believed that this is a result of the ineffectiveness of the legal system 
in protecting property rights.  Concentrated ownership and family 
control are important in countries where legal protection of property 
rights is relatively weak.  Weak property rights are also behind the 
prevalence of familyowned businesses  organization forms that reduce 
transaction costs and asymmetric information problems. 
Id. 
318 Mohanty, supra note 157, at 234. 
319 Franklin Allen et al., The Financial Systems Capacity in China and India 4 
(Nov. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.icrier.org/pdf 
/6dec07/Paper_%20Rajesh%20Chakrabarti_Session1.pdf. 
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such as friends, family, business partners, and informal trade 
creditors.320  Only 26% of funds are obtained from formal sources, 
which reduce the need for companies and creditors to rely on legal 
remedies.321
Another significant concern is corruption, which 
legal system in general, and the enforcement of corporate laws in 
particular.322  For example, there is rampant tax evasion and a 
significant shadow economy, which accounts for about 23% of 
 323  While India may have weak enforcement of its 
laws, it does punish underperforming CEOs because, 
more likely to lose their jobs when corporate performance is 
324
Until India more consistently implements its laws through 
judicial enforcement, the shareholder litigation rights created in the 
new Companies Bill will likely prove ineffective.  l 
system cannot more expeditiously render judgments, then 
shareholders will simply choose not to seek a remedy through the 
courts.  
corrupt, they will not seek judicial remedies.  Although India is 
seeking to implement shareholder litigation rights to increase 
       
undermine that effort.  Consequently, domestic and foreign 
investment in Indian companies may not reach the levels India 
seeks until judicial reform occurs. 
5.3. Problems Implementing Effective Shareholder Litigation in China 
One issue with passing sweeping national corporate 
        
trespassed into the traditional territories of both the Company Law 
and Securities Law.  This is particularly true in the area of 
325  Consequently, the division between the 
supervisory powers of the CSRC and the authority of the stock 
320 Id.
321 Id. at 5. 
322 See Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 15 (discussing the rise of continued 
widespread corruption in the Indian corporate sector since the 1950s). 
323 Allen et al., supra note 116, at 8. 
324 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 13. 
325 Wei, supra note 200, 
not provide detailed provisions on corporate governance, the CSRC has 
endeavored 
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exchanges is unclear, leading to confusion in regulation of 
companies and securities markets.326  Uncertainty in the law leads 
to confusion over corporate governance rules.  For example, it is 
unclear what duties directors owe to the company.  
and regulatory practice remains unclear on the issue of standards 
of liability for independent directors, and indeed for directors in 
327  In       
shareholder actions and civil remedies may lead to enforcement 
328 Shareholder derivative lawsuits, however, may 
serve as one way to promote corporate governance reform in 
China if the law can be sufficiently clarified to allow effective 
enforcement.329  While China is not a common law country judicial 
decisions in shareholder derivative lawsuits ca
of permissible conduct, and that may . . . be generalized by the 
       
330
5.3.1.  A Struggling Legal System  
No matter the period of rule in China, policy has been 
emphasized over law.  During the Maoist period, the government 
believed that laws were too rigid and would hamper the 
revolution.331  Policy ruled the country, and legislation only served 
as a rubber stamp upon government policy.332  During the 
Maoist period, the State directed judges to decide cases according 
to policy goals rather than legal principles.333
326 See id. at 503 (describing that while China theoretically has a system of 
both government supervision and selfregulation, in practice government 
supervision is paramount and stock exchange selfregulation is marginal) see also 
Shi, supra note 200, at 47779 (explaining the CSRC  gulatory 
presence over Chinese stock exchanges     
). 
327 Clarke, supra note 226, at 224 app. 1. 
328 Shi, supra note 200, at 485. 
329 See Deng, supra note 244, at 355 (indicating that a wellinstituted 
shareholder litigation system would improve governance in China). 
330 Id.
331 See Layton, supra note 205, at 1959 (noting Mao Zedong's view of the law 
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Modern China continues to have little judicial independence 
  
334  Not only are courts financed 
by the level of government that created them, but they are also 
administratively and institutionally accountable335 to the 
government.336  For example, the Chinese Communist Party 
supervises judges performing government administrative 
functions such as tax collection.337  In addition, many judges in the 
provinces are not legally trained.338  This lack of independence as 
well as reliance on policy over law engenders a biased judiciary 
that often favors local defendants.339  The Chinese Communist 
Party has announced that it will elevate the prominence of its laws, 
but this elevation will only occur visàvis policy.340  However, 
most laws and regulations continue to be an embodiment of 
Chinese Communist Party policy.341  Thus, whether the 
shareholder derivative provisions of the 2005 Company Law will 
improve corporate governance and truly permit shareholders to 
334 Id. at 195758. 
335 Id. at 1958 (quoting Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence and Judicial 
Accountability: An Empirical Study of Individual Case Supervision, 55 CHINA J. 67, 71 
(2006). 
336 See id. [Courts] are subject to supervision from [China Communist Party] 
organizations and procuratorates, have limited adjudicative authority, are 
charged with other responsibilities such as tax collection, and primarily employ 

337 Donald C. Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in
BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL AFPPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 164, 
17475 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) ( stating that 
governments often enlist judges in the work of birth control, tax collecting, urban 

338 Layton, supra note 205, at 1958.    
L.L.B. degrees is estimated at less than ten percent and applicants for judgeships 
were not required to take national bar examination until 2002 Id. n.73 (citing 
Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 29 (2006). 
339 See id.        

340 Id. at 1959.  In 1996, the president of China formally adopted a policy of 
ruling China in accordance with the rule of law.  Id. n.83 
341 Id. at 1959       
Communist Partytoday governance
of internal [Chinese Communist Party] rules instead of judicial sanctions to 
punish party members for le      
discretion (internal citations omitted)). 
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recover for mismanagement remains uncertain due to the doubtful 
ability of Chinese courts to enforce the new law.342
Not only do Chinese courts struggle to remain independent, 
they also struggle to enforce judgments in civil actions.  p to 
fifty percent of civil judgments [in China] go unenforced343
Judgments go unenforced because courts lack sufficient personnel 
and judgeswho are selected and paid by local governments
often refuse to enforce actions against powerful local parties.344
Additionally, other government agencies have proven unwilling to 
assist courts in enforcing civil judgments.345
     m hampers effective 
implementation of shareholder derivative lawsuits, other 
alternatives may be needed.  Public enforcement measures might 
be preferable to lawsuits since China] has traditionally placed 
greater emphasis on [its public enforcement] laws to maintain 
control and discipline.346  Similarly, China may consider utilizing 
private enforcement mechanisms rather than relying solely upon 
shareholder derivative lawsuits.  Parties in China often use 
mediation (a private dispute resolution mechanism) because it is 
endorsed by the government and is less expensive than civil 
lawsuits.347
In addition to judicial problems, shareholders will likely face 
difficulty in finding adequate representation to file shareholder 
derivative actions.  China lacks a sufficient number of legally 
trained professionals to act as lawyers and judges.348  Lawyers 
represent clients in only about 10 to 25% of civil cases and only 
about 4% of Chinese business entities retain regular legal 
342 See Shi, supra note          
improved legislation will change practices, as law enforcement has been a long
 id. at 484
). 
343 Layton, supra note 205, at 195859. 
344 See id. at 1959 (explaining why many judgments are not enforced in 
China). 
345 See id. at 1959 (using the example of stateowned banks refusing or 
delaying requests to freeze accounts). 
346 Id. at 1960. 
347 Id.       mediation continue to 

omitted).
348 Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 43, 64 
(2000). 
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advisors.349  Moreover, even if a shareholder obtained a lawyer, a 
Chinese lawyer might hesitate to even file a shareholder derivative 
action.  
bar associations and controls their professional licenses through a 
   350  By denying reregistration to an 
attorney, the judicial authorities avoid the procedures required for 
formal suspension or withdrawal.  Therefore, because lawyers
licenses to practice law must be registered annually, lawyers may 
avoid accepting cases that challenge the government in some way.  
Such cases may include actions against SOEs or actions against 
private Chinese corporations if the government is a significant 
shareholder.  Even filing cases can be difficult for lawyers, because 
courts have much discretion in accepting cases and often apply 
both political and legal criteria to determine whether to accept 
cases.351  This may further dissuade attorneys from prosecuting 
shareholder derivative actions as permitted by the 2005 Company 
Law.   
5.3.2.  Unclear and Problematic Procedures 
        
and inconsistent array of laws, regulations, provisions, measures, 
directives, notices, decisions, explanations, and so forth, all 
claiming to be normatively binding.352  It thus is not surprising 
that commentators have been quick to criticize the procedures 
outlined in Article 152 of the 2005 Company Law.353  One critic has 
noted that the 2005 Company Law may face enforcement problems 
       rocedures for taking such an 
action, nor does it elaborate on the types of remedies available to 
  354  In addition, Professor 
Huang has argued that the 2005 Law poses standing issues since 
only current shareholders are allowed to file lawsuits.355  Unlike 
349 Id. 
350 China: Rights Lawyers Face Disbarment Threats, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
(May 30, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/05/28/chinarightslawyers
facedisbarmentthreats. 
351 Id.
352 Orts, supra note 348, at 68. 
353 See Huang, supra note 230, at 24249 (providing detailed criticism of the 
procedures in Article 152 and suggesting potential reforms). 
354 Shi, supra note 200, at 495. 
355 Huang, supra note 230, at 242 
in derivative lawsuits is both underinclusive and overinclusive). 
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shareholder lawsuits in Australia and Canada, former shareholders 
may not bring lawsuits.356  However, only current shareholders are 
allowed to file shareholder derivative lawsuits in U.S. state and 
federal courts. 
The 2005 Company Law also does not specify a statute of 
limitations.  By applying the 1986 General Principles of the Civil 
Law, however, the applicable statute of limitations is likely two 
years from when the company knew or should have known that its 
rights were infringed.357  Since it is   
        
of limitations, the current law may prove unfair to shareholders.358
Company officials with knowledge of the infringement may 
simply allow the statute of limitations to lapse without taking 
actions because they could be defendants in a derivative lawsuit.359
In addition, shareholder derivative litigation costs have also 
dissuaded shareholders in China from filing lawsuits.  Litigation 
costs in Chin       
 the 360  Article 19 of the 
       
Acceptance of Litigation Fees, written in 1989, requires the losing 
party to pay filing fees and litigation costs, but each party still pays 
   361  This measure could be applied to 
shareholder derivative lawsuits, because the 2005 Company Law 
   
paid and clearly does not provide financial incentives for 
shareholders to bring shareholder derivative lawsuits.362  However, 
the matter is uncertain.       
investments, a rational investor in a Chinese corporation may 
prefer to simply sell his shares rather than litigate in the absence of 
such financial incentives.363
356 See id. at 24243 (com     
lawsuits to those of Australia and Canada). 
357 Huang, supra note 204, at 910. 
358 See id. at 10 (noting that minority shareholders may be prejudiced because 
. 
359 Id.
360 Id. at 9 n.42. 
361 Id. at 9. 
362 Id. at 16. 
363 Id. at 13 (noting that litigation costs will detract most rational shareholders 
from bringing derivative lawsuits rather than simply selling their shares). 
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The likelihood and effectiveness of shareholder derivative 
lawsuits could increase if China amends the 2005 Company Law in 
key ways.  For instance, shareholders would be more willing to 
bring derivative lawsuits if an indemnity provision safeguarded 
losing shareholders against paying litigation costs and the 
 where such lawsuit
good faith and in the best interest of the company.364  Other 
commentators have offered suggestions for funding Chinese 
derivative lawsuits based on financing mechanisms in other 
countries.365  To facilitate shareholder derivative lawsuits, courts 
could also provide      
documents rather than requiring them to wait for the documents 
until during discovery or at trial.366  Shareholders in the United 
States, for instance, typically possess a right to inspect the 
 367  In addition, the 2005 Company Law lacks 
any settlement provision.  Typically, settlements are not subject to 
court supervision in China, which increases the chances of 
frivolous lawsuits.368  To prevent this yet permit meritorious 
      
settlements.369
6. CONCLUSION
Shareholder derivative litigation has been recognized for 
hundreds of years within the United States.  Most states have 
adopted statutory provisions explicitly empowering shareholders 
to file derivative actions on behalf of corporations and defining 
    Despite much criticism, shareholder 
364 Id. at 15. 
365 See Zhong Zhang, Making Shareholder Derivative Actions Happen in China: 
How Should Lawsuits be Funded?, 38 H.K. L.J. 523, 53037 (2008) (analogizing the 
several Western approaches to funding shareholder derivative lawsuits as 
providing potential guidance for funding derivative lawsuits in China). 
366 See Huang, supra note 204, at 17  trial 
           
derivative lawsuit system). 
367 See id. at 17 n.74 (discussing the shareholder demand for inspection of 
records provision under Delaware law). 
368 See id. at 10 (noting that Chinese courts are not required to approve 
     settlement[s] without a 

369 See id.  
approving settlements of derivative lawsuits. 
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derivative actions are frequently litigated in the United States and 
thus continue to play an important role in corporate governance.  
Criticism of shareholder derivative litigation in the United States 
has not deterred either India or China from recognizing 
shareholder derivative litigation.  China has adopted statutory 
provisions that closely resemble the MBCA, which has been 
enacted by a majority of U.S. states.  India has proposed a statutory 
provision that also recognizes derivative actions, although only its 

United States law. 
India and China are both focused on developing a free market 
system of private investment in corporate entities.  Both countries 
have recognized derivative actions for the purpose of increasing 
       
willingness to invest in their corporations.  To some extent, both 
countries may anticipate that statutory provisions for shareholder 
derivative actions may improve corporate governance, either as a 
preventative measure to deter bad conduct by managers or to 
remedy injuries suffered by corporations from such conduct.  Thus, 
China and Indpursuit of a free market system has motivated 
them to empower shareholders to file derivative actions on behalf 
of corporations. 
Shareholder derivative litigation in India and China, however, 
faces significant challenges that may suggest the likelihood and 
effectiveness of such litigation is marginal in the near future.  India 
will need to clarify the causes of action on which shareholders may 
file derivative actions and also clarify for the procedures for doing 
so.       to provide more prompt 
adjudications for shareholder derivative litigation to be useful in 
holding directors accountable or improving future decision
making by directors.  China also will need to improve its judicial 
system.  Both countries will need to develop explicit procedures to 
guide shareholder derivative litigation and perhaps to encourage 
shareholders to bring such lawsuits.  Similarly, both countries also 
must develop their definitions of fiduciary duties for shareholder 
derivative litigation to       
conduct. 
This comparative analysis offers insights for investors and 
corporations in the United States, as well as for the states.  First, 
investors should recognize that the shareholder derivative devices 
as expressed by India and China does not offer the same 
protections as it does in the United States, particularly given their 
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existing legal systems.  Although the recognition of derivative 
litigation by India and China is appealing for symbolic reasons, it 
provides only false comfort because their current legal systems are 
unable to resolve the internal corporate disputes presented by such 
litigation.  Until substantial judicial reform occurs, the simple 
message is buyer beware. 
Corporations that adopt arbitration provisions to eliminate 
tigation may place 
themselves at a competitive disadvantage.  To the extent that 
corporations feel shareholder derivative litigation is broken, then 
corporations should work with investors to improve the current 
system.  As recent developments in India and China demonstrate, 
such efforts will likely influence other countries, especially in light 
of efforts to harmonize corporate governance standards within the 
global economy. 
Finally, this Article offers a broader message on the direction 
that the United States should be moving within the global 
economy.  Two of the largest and fastest growing markets in the 
world, India and China, have been decisively moving toward free 
market systems and away from their prior socialist and communist 
systems, respectively.  Both countries have been disentangling 
government from business enterprises, reducing regulations, 
minimizing government interventions in the markets, and seeking 
methods for bet The changes that 
they have implemented toward free market systems have proven 
tremendously successful.  To the extent that the United States is 
edging away from its free market system through recent bailouts 
and extensive new regulations, it is moving in the wrong direction 
and is out of step with the global economy.  The United States 
must carefully consider the likely consequences of intervening in 
private corporations and the capital markets.   
ability to effectively compete for capital in the global economy 
likely depends on its continued support of the free market 
principles that are being so widely adopted by other countries.
